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ARTICLES
Dale D. Goble*

The Council and the Constitution:
An Article on the Constitutionality
of the Northwest Power Planning
Council

C

Congress "created a new constitution" for the Federal Columbia River Power System and the Pacific Northwest's electric
power resources 1 when it enacted the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act (PNEPPCA or the Act) in
1980.2 It did so by restructuring the relationship between the region's electric power and fishery interests. 3 The centerpiece of this
* Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law; B.A., Columbia
College; J.D., University of Oregon. I would like to thank Mike Blumm, Chris
Kelly, Frank Ostrander, and Steve Smith for helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this article, and Charles Wilkinson for letting me (again) pick his mind. The
usual disclaimers of responsibility apply.
' What the States Wanted: A Hemingway Retrospective, Nw. ENERGY NEWS,
Dec./Jan., 1985/86, at 4, 7 (quoting Council member and former lobbyist Roy
Hemingway) [hereinafter Hemingway Retrospective].
2 Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839839h (1982)). The Act is applicable to the "Pacific Northwest," an area defined
by the Columbia River Basin. It includes Idaho, Oregon, and Washington as well
as Montana west of the Continental Divide, and those parts of Nevada, Utah,
and Wyoming which are within the Columbia Basin. Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act § 3(14), 16 U.S.C. § 839a(14) (1982).
1 The Act had two major effects on the various regional interests. First, it
restructured the relationships among the previously limited group of participants.
These participants can be somewhat simplistically placed into four groups: (1)
the federal agencies that operate the Federal Columbia River Power System
projects (the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation), sell the
power (the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)), or license nonfederal hy-
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new structure is the state-appointed Pacific Northwest Electric
Power and Conservation Planning Council (Northwest Power
Planning Council or the Council), which is to plan the region's
electric energy future and oversee the rebuilding of the Columbia
River Basin's fabled anadromous salmon and steelhead runs.
This new "constitution," however, is itself now challenged as
unconstitutional.' The challenge centers on the Council and the
scope of its authority. The fundamental issue is whether the feddroelectric projects (the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); (2) the investor-owned utilities; (3) the publicly owned utilities (cooperatives, public utility
districts, or municipalities); and (4) the direct service industries which purchase
their electricity directly from BPA. See infra note 28.
Second, the Act enfranchised a disparate group of interests which had not
been represented previously in regional energy policies. Due to the Act's participation requirements, e.g., Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 4(g), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(g) (1982), the public generally has a
much greater possibility of involvement in energy decision making. More specifically, the Act also enfranchised (1) the four regional states, by empowering them
to appoint the Northwest Power Planning Council (the Council), id. § 4(a), 16
U.S.C. § 839b(a), and (2) those interested in the anadromous fish resource, by
requiring the Council to prepare a fish enhancement program following elaborate
consultation provisions. Id. § 4(h), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h).
" In July, 1983, a coalition of construction industry groups challenged the legality of the Northwest Conservation and Power Plan (the Plan) prepared by the
Council, and the constitutionality of the Council itself. See Petitioners' Opening
Brief at 1, Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and
Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Petitioners' Opening Brief]. The homebuilders were joined by Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation at 8-36,
Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Pacific Legal
Foundation Brief]. The Northwest Power Planning Council was joined by the
four regional states and the National Governors' Association as amicus. See
Brief of Amici Curiae States of Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Washington and
the National Governors' Association, Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific
Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th
Cir. 1986) [hereinafter State Amici Brief]. The United States was allowed to
intervene as a respondent. See Brief for the United States as Intervenor at 6,
Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter United States
Brief].
The challenge to the Plan centered on the Model Conservation Standards
(MCS). The MCS are building design standards applicable to new electrically
heated residential buildings; the standards are "to produce all power savings that
are cost-effective for the region and are economically feasible for consumers."
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 4(f)(1), 16
U.S.C. § 839b(f)(l) (1982). The MCS are to be implemented by state and local
governments. Failure to do so can lead to the imposition of a surcharge on electricity sold by BPA to the utility serving the nonimplementing jurisdiction. Id. §
4(f)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(f)(2).

The Council and the Constitution

eral Constitution prohibits Congress and the states from creating
cooperative regional institutions to manage regional resources.
More specifically, the question is whether Congress can constitutionally authorize a state-appointed body to guide the actions of a
federal agency. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has provided
a preliminary answer to these questions, concluding that the
Northwest Power Planning Council is constitutional.' That conclusion, however, is currently on appeal. 6
This article examines the dispute. To provide the necessary
background, it first reviews the Act's history and its substantive
provisions. The article then examines the constitutional bases of
the Act and the challenge to those bases in the context of the
The builders contend that (1) the MCS fail to satisfy the statutory standards
because they are neither cost-effective nor economically feasible; (2) the MCS
are unreasonable because the Council failed to test the proposed standards for
their actual effectiveness; (3) the MCS would inequitably affect new construction; and (4) the Council unlawfully failed to prepare an environmental impact
statement. See Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra, at 49-55. In addition, the
builders argue that the Council is unconstitutional, thereby making the MCS
invalid. The constitutional issues are the subject of this article.
The constitutional questions are presented only indirectly by the factual setting. The builders argue that the Council is unconstitutional because it exercises
significant authority over a federal agency, which it cannot do unless it is composed of federal appointees. Under most provisions of PNEPPCA, the BPA Administrator is required to act in a manner "consistent" with the Plan and the
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program (the Program). See infra notes
43-68 and accompanying text. Such requirements would appear to raise the issue
presented by the homebuilders since the federal agency is subject to planning
decisions made by a nonfederal body. The MCS, however, are unusual in that
the Council is only authorized to recommend, not dictate, a surcharge to the
BPA Administrator. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 4(f)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(f)(2) (1982). Thus, it is argued, the MCS
do not raise the constitutional issue since the Administrator is not required to act
consistently with the Council's determination on imposing a surcharge. This is
the position of the United States, which, at BPA's urging, intervened in the suit.
The United States argued that "the power to make recommendation[s] to a federal agency does not constitute the exercise of significant authority for purposes
of the Appointments Clause." United States Brief, supra, at 6. The United
States urged the court not to reach the constitutional issue which it acknowledged was raised by other provisions of the Act. Id. at 6-7. The Ninth Circuit,
however, did not note this difficulty. See Seattle Master Builders Ass'n. v. Pacific
Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th
Cir. 1986).
1 Seattle Master Builders Ass'n. v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986). The initial version of
this article was in the publication process when the Ninth Circuit's decision was
announced.
" The homebuilders recently filed a petition for certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court. See 55 U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1986) (No. 86-629).
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Ninth Circuit's decision. A major difficulty in analyzing the issues
raised by the statute is the parties' complete disagreement as to
what those issues are. The challengers characterize the case as
involving a question of separation of powers.' The Council, on the
other hand, views the case as raising federalism issues.8
The homebuilders challenging the Act raise the separation-ofpowers issues because they view the Act as a congressional attempt to subject an executive branch agency, the Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA), to the control of a nonexecutive
branch body, the Council. They contend, first, that the Council is
not an interstate compact agency but is instead a federal agency
because it lacks "the classic indicia of an interstate compact." 9
The Act therefore is unconstitutional because the Council's members were not appointed by the executive branch as required by
the appointments clause of the Constitution. Alternatively, the
Council's opponents argue that, even if it is an interstate compact
agency, its members are required to be appointed in compliance
with the appointments clause because -of the Council's authority
over BPA. The appointment of Council members by the Governors of the four regional states violates the appointments clause,
the challengers argue, because an executive branch agency is subject to control by officials not appointed by the President. The
homebuilders thus conclude that Congress sought unconstitutionally to intrude into an area reserved to the executive branch when
it authorized the regional states to appoint individuals to control a
federal agency.10
The Council and the states, on the other hand, view the case as
involving federalism issues. They contend that the Council is a
validly created interstate compact agency. They argue that the

' See Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and
Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1372-73 (Beezer, J., dissenting); Pacific Legal Foundation Brief, supra note 4, at 15-16; Petitioners' Opening Brief,
supra note 4, at 53-55; Petitioners' Reply Brief at 22-25, Seattle Master Builders
Ass'n. v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786
F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Petitioners' Reply Brief].
6 Respondent's Brief at 64-71, Seattle Master Builders Ass'n. v. Pacific
Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th
Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
I Seattle Master Builders Ass'n. v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1372 (Beezer, J., dissenting); see also Pacific Legal Foundation Brief, supra note 4, at 23-33; Petitioners' Reply Brief,
supra note 7, at 27-29.
10 Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 53-55; Petitioners' Reply Brief,
supra note 7, at 21-25.
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Council's authority over BPA's decision making is constitutionally
permissible since it is merely an example of the general principle
that federal agencies can be subject to state law when there is a
"clear congressional mandate."'" Thus, the Council's defenders
conclude that although the Act includes two uncommon features-an interstate compact agency and a waiver of federal
supremacy-neither raises significant constitutional problems.
This article concludes that the Council is constitutional. Both
prongs of the homebuilders' argument are predicated upon the belief that Congress may not constitutionally subject federal agencies to state decisionmakers. Thus they argue that the Council is
not a compact because of the control it exercises over BPA'2 and
that its members must be appointed by the executive branch because of the authority they possess.' 3 Challengers and proponents
alike, however, have overstated the novelty of the Council. Although it is widely touted as unique,' 4 its novelty is the result of
combining common components into a new arrangement. By
themselves, the Council's components-an interstate compact
agency and a relinquishment of federal supremacy over the management of federal property-are hardly novel. In fact, even the
combination has precedent.' 5 The challenge to the constitutional" Seattle Master Builders Ass'n. v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1364; Respondent's Brief, supra note 8,
at 64-71; State Amici Brief, supra note 4, at 23-26.
11 Seattle Master Builders Ass'n. v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1373 (Beezer, J., dissenting); Petitioners' Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 27-33.
Is Seattle Master Builders Ass'n. v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1375-76 (Beezer, J., dissenting); Pacific
Legal Foundation Brief, supra note 4, at 10-15; Petitioners' Opening Brief,
supra note 4, at 50-55.
" E.g., Hemingway, The Northwest Power Planning Council: Its Origins and
Future Role, 13 ENVTL. L. 673 (1983) ("[Tjhe Council is a unique experiment
in American federalism.
...
).
Is Both the Susquehanna River Basin Compact and the Delaware River Basin
Compact authorize the compact agency to develop a comprehensive plan for the
development of water resources in the respective river basins. Each also restricts
the decision making authority of federal agencies by providing that "[nlo expenditure or commitment shall be made for or on account of the construction, acquisition or operation of any [federal] project or facility nor shall it be deemed
authorized, unless it shall have first been included by the [interstate] commission
in the comprehensive plan." Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91575, § 12.1, 84 Stat. 1509, 1524 (1970); see Delaware River Basin Compact,
Pub. L. No. 87-328, § 11.1(b), 75 Stat. 688, 701 (1961).
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ity of the Council thus rests upon a misperception of the Council
and of the Constitution.16

THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER PLANNING AND
CONSERVATION ACT

A. The Historical Context
PNEPPCA's roots lie in the high degree of cooperation which
has developed among the utilities in the Pacific Northwest. 17 This
cooperation can initially be traced to the role of BPA as the region's wholesaler of electricity and to the mutual benefits which
resulted from operating the region's hydroelectric projects in a coordinated fashion.' 8 By the 1960's, most projects were operated
under a unified management system. Given this history of cooper1" Although the constitutional challenge has little basis, the current litigation
and the resulting uncertainty has allowed BPA and the other managers of the
federal property subject to disposition under PNEPPCA to evade the statutory
obligations. See Blumm, Reexamining the Parity Promise: More Challenges
than Successes to the Implementation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 461 (1986); Chaney, Implementing the Columbia River
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program: A Case History, 22 IDAHO L. REV. - (1986)
(in press); Lothrop, The Failure of the Fish Passage Provisions of the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program and Some Suggested Remedies, 34 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO 1 (1985).
17 This brief historical background draws primarily upon H.R. REP. No. 976,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 26-32, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6023, 6023-30; K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, ELECTRIC

POWER AND THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1980); Balmer, From

Symbiosis to Synergy: A Case Study of Public and Private Electric Power in
the Pacific Northwest, 13 ENVTL. L. 637, 646-58 (1983); Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 214-30 (1983).
is By the end of the 1950's, BPA had assumed a central role in the planning
and operation of the region's electric power system. This role was enhanced in
the 1960's with the authorization of four upstream storage projects in the Columbia River Treaty between Canada and the United States. Columbia River
Treaty, Jan. 17, 1961-Sept. 16, 1964, United States-Canada, arts. I1, XII, 15
U.S.T. 1555, 1558, 1563-65, T.I.A.S. No. 5638. See generally Johnson, The Canada-United States Controversy over the Columbia River, 41 WASH. L. REV.
676 (1966). The availability of storage increased the centralization of the region's electric power system by increasing the potential amount of electricity
which could be generated by the downstream dams. Capturing this potential,
however, required an integrated operation of all the dams in the basin so that
releases of water could be fully utilized. The result was the Pacific Northwest
Coordination Agreement which "formalized 'the one-utility concept' under which
system operations are coordinated to maximize hydropower production." Blumm,
supra note 17, at 218.
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ation and the advantages it produced, it was natural for the region's utilities to integrate their planning for future load requirements. In the 1960's, when the region's utilities and BPA forecast
substantial power requirements for the 1980's, they developed a
regional response. Since the available hydroelectric sites had been
dammed, attention focused on thermal generating plants. For the
publicly owned utilities, the transition to a thermal system was to
be financed through "net billing," an accounting procedure under
which BPA agreed to purchase the future output of a thermal
plant, paying for the power by crediting its preference customers'
accounts for the amount of money the customer invested in the
plant. 9 The investor-owned utilities (IOUs) were expected to
build their own thermal plants to meet their load growth. Since
the projected cost of electricity from these plants was only slightly
higher than existing hydroelectricity, the loss of inexpensive BPAmarketed power was not expected to be significant. Under this
"Phase One Hydro-Thermal Program," construction was begun
on seven thermal plants."
When escalating costs of the thermal plants exhausted the possibilities of net billing in late 1973, BPA concluded that it had
insufficient power reserves to provide firm power to nonpreference
customers and announced that it would not renew contracts with
either the IOUs or the direct service industries (DSIs). 2 ' The result was a flurry of rate increases for customers of IOUs, renegotiated contracts with the DSIs, and the beginning of a Phase Two
Hydro-Thermal Program. Since Phase Two was developed by
BPA and the utilities without public involvement, it ran afoul of
the then recently enacted National Environmental Policy Act of
One byproduct of this method of operation was the decimation of the already
declining anadromous fish stocks of the Columbia Basin. See Blumm, Hydropower v. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous Fish
Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Columbia River Power
System, II ENVTL. L. 211, 243-47, 251 (1981); Goble, Introduction to the Symposium on Legal Structures for Managing the Pacific Northwest Salmon and
Steelhead: The Biological and Historical Context, 22 IDAHO L. REV. - (1986)

(in press).
19 See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 17, at 80-81. The Bonneville Power Administration effectively accepted the risk that the plants would
never come on line.
SO See

generally id. at 66-86.

The DSIs are primarily aluminum plants which purchase electricity directly
from BPA. See id. at 40.
"
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1969 (NEPA).2 2 BPA was required to terminate its involvement
pending preparation of an environmental impact statement.2 3 The
demise of Phase Two created a regional crisis of predicted
shortages and immediate rate disparities between customers of the
IOUs and those of the publicly owned utilities. Litigation seeking
access to the cheap federal power was initiated, and the state of
Oregon enacted legislation creating the Oregon Domestic and Rural Power Authority in an attempt to obtain a share of the preference power.2 4 As the struggle for BPA electricity and the prospect
of lengthy court battles increased, so did pressure for a legislative
solution to the allocational problems facing the region.25
Although legislative changes to BPA's authority were considered as early as 1975, it was not until 1977 that a bill drafted by
the region's utilities was introduced. Regional negotiations continued for the next three years. The oil shortages and the resulting
energy crisis of the 1970's had changed the political landscape;
the utility industry was no longer the only interested group. BPA
and the industry could no longer simply impose their wishes: "Energy policy alternatives were by now of interest to additional
groups who wanted to participate in decision making. Environmental groups, antinuclear activists, and soft technology supporters joined fish interests and Indian tribes in seeking a voice in
power and river policies." 26 PNEPPCA emerged from these extended negotiations when a majority of the interests concluded
that their interrelationships were so extensive that accommodation
27
was necessary.
11 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).

" Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, 435 F. Supp. 590 (D. Or.
1977), affd sub nor. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Munro, 626 F.2d
134 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1156 (D. Or. 1975), aff'd, 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1979).
"' See generally K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 17, at 131,
165-66; Larsen, Public v. Private Power Revisited: An Oregon Power Authority
Proposal, 7 ENVTL. L. 315 (1977).
11 The completion of the Trojan nuclear power plant, for example, quadrupled
Portland's rates within three years. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note
17, at 140.
16 Balmer, supra note 17, at 656.
As Representative Dicks of Washington explained to his House colleagues:
The bill enjoys widespread, bipartisan support both within and without the
Northwest region. It is needed this year to avert a serious economic and
energy crisis that will engulf the Northwest in a potentially explosive reallocation of energy when the Bonneville Power Administration's contracts
begin expiring in 1981.
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B.

The Substantive Provisions

1. A Sketch of the Act
PNEPPCA has three primary components. First, it allocates
low-cost federal hydroelectricity. Section five of the Act increases
BPA's obligations to supply electricity by requiring it to provide
power to customers who previously lacked an allocation, while simultaneously restricting the agency's authority to reduce its supply obligations.2 8 Second, BPA's authority to acquire electricity is
With this legislation, these problems can be averted. This bill embodies
a regionally negotiated and supported "peace treaty" by all of the affected
parties. It insures a smooth reallocation of power by establishing a regional
planning process which permits BPA to sign new utility and industry contracts necessary for the coordinated planning and efficient use of regional
resources.
126 CONG. REC. 29,802 (1980); see also id. at 29,806-7 (statement of Rep.
Swift); id. at 27,827 (statement of Rep. Gore); id. at 27,812-3 (statement of
Rep. Lujan); id. at 27,809-10 (statement of Rep. Kazen).
The one major group which continued to oppose the bill was the environmental
community, which viewed it as a thermal power plant relief act. Cavanagh, The
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation (and Thermal
Power Plant Relied) Act, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 27 (1980); see also 126
CONG. REc. 29,803 (1980) (statement of Rep. AuCoin); id. at 29,801-02 (statement of Rep. Weaver). But see Conservation's Vote, Nw. ENERGY NEws, Dec./
Jan., 1985/86, at 23 (quoting Cavanagh: "In retrospect, I'm more than happy to
admit that I'm glad the Act passed.").
28 Prior to the adoption of the Act, BPA's obligations were restricted to the
Federal Columbia River Power System hydroelectric projects and the agency's
net billed interest in the Phase One Hydro-Thermal plants, since the agency was
not authorized to acquire generating capacity. 16 U.S.C. § 832a (1982).
PNEPPCA dramatically changed this by defining a minimum statutory entitlement for each of the four classes of BPA customers, and requiring the agency to
offer its customers new contracts within nine months of the Act's adoption. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 5(g)(l), 16
U.S.C. § 839c(g)(1) (1982).
(1) publicly owned utilities (publics): The Act required that BPA offer each
public a contract to provide firm electric power to meet its load in excess of its
then-existing generating capacity. BPA thus contracted to meet the full power
requirements of those publics without generating capacity, and the load growth
of those publics with generating capacity. Id. § 5(b), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b). BPA
can restrict its obligations to provide electricity to the publics as a class only
when their total demand plus that of the federal agencies exceeds the capability
of the Federal Base System. Id. § 5(b)(6), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b)(6).
(2) federal agencies: The federal agencies in the region are to receive contracts
from BPA on the same terms as the publics, including the right not to have their
power supply reduced until the full capability of the Federal Base System has
been employed. Id. § 5(b)(3), (6), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b)(3), (6).
(3) investor-owned utilities (IOUs): BPA was to offer a regional IOU a contract to meet the IOU's load in excess of that utility's then-existing generating
capacity. BPA's contractual responsibility to provide power to an IOU, however,
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enhanced to enable it to meet its increased responsibilities. Section
six authorizes BPA to acquire 9 the output of new conserving and
generating resources.30 This new authority, however, is restricted
is subject to the statutory preference for publics and agencies. Contracts with
IOUs thus provide that BPA may restrict sales. Id. § 5(b)(l), (2), 16 U.S.C. §
839c(b)(1), (2). The contractual entitlement of an IOU thus is limited to the

amount of power which BPA acquires from or on behalf of that customer. Id. §
5(e), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(e).
(4) direct service industries (DSIs): Each DSI was offered a contract for the
amount of "industrial firm power" which the DSI had contracted to purchase in
1975. Id. § 5(d)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(1). To meet its firm power obligations
to other customers, BPA can freely restrict the top quartile of power to a DSI.
See H.R. REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 48, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6023, 6046; id. pt. 1, at 62. A DSI's statutory
entitlement thus is to seventy-five percent of the power for which it previously
held a contract when the remaining twenty-five percent is necessary to meet firm
load requirements.
The statutory entitlements created by the Act in section five thus are the sum
of (1) the total Federal Base System, (2) seventy-five percent of the DSI load,
and (3) any power BPA acquires from or on behalf of any customer. The Act
deems the existing resources sufficient for the contracts required by the section.
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 5(g)(7), 16
U.S.C. § 839c(g)(7) (1982).
See generally Mellem, Darkness to Dawn? Generating and Conserving Electricity in the Pacific Northwest: A Primer on the Northwest Power Act, 58
WASH. L. REV. 245 (1983); Michie, Impacts of the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planningand ConservationAct on the Development of Energy Resources
in the Pacific Northwest: An Analysis of the Resource Acquisition Priority
Scheme, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 299 (1981).

'9 The Act specifies that acquisition of resources under section six "shall not
be construed as authorizing the Administrator to construct, or have ownership of
• . . any electric generating facility." Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act § 3(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839a(l) (1982). The authority to
acquire a resource thus is only the power to purchase the output of a generating
facility.
" The Act increases BPA's authority by specifying that "the Administrator
shall acquire . . . sufficient resources

. . .

to meet his contractual obligations"

incurred under section five. Id. § 6(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(a)(2). The Act also
recognizes the need for flexibility and provides BPA several alternatives for accomplishing its new statutory responsibilities.
The Act grants BPA the power to acquire resources to meet its obligations. In
acquiring resources, however, BPA must promote conservation; generating resources can be acquired only if there are insufficient conservation or renewable
resources to meet projected demands. Id. §§ 4(e)(1), 6(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. §§
839b(e)(l), 839d(a)(1). The preference for conservation is demonstrated not
only by ranking it first in priority for resource acquisitions, id. § 4(e)(1), 16
U.S.C. § 839b(e)(1), but also by granting it a 10% cost bonus. Id. § 3(4)(D), 16
U.S.C. § 839a(4)(D). This preference also extends to the methods which BPA
can employ to acquire conservation. The Act authorizes the agency to make
loans and grants directly to individuals and businesses for conservation, id. §
6(a)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(a)(1)(A), to issue bonds to finance the loans and
grants, id. § 8(d), 16 U.S.C. § 838k, to provide billing credits to a utility which
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by the third major component of the Act, the Northwest Power
Planning Council. BPA's authority is conditioned upon the requirement that the agency must act consistently with two plans
developed by the Council.31 As one of the chief sponsors of the bill
noted, "[t]he regional power plan, drafted by the regional council,
will be the map of the region's future energy path."3 2
The council mechanism was initially proposed by the region's
governors, who felt that the utility-drafted bill did not give sufficient emphasis to the public interest in regional energy planning. 3
As adopted, the Council is composed of eight persons, two of
whom are appointed by each of the four regional states: Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, and Washington. 4 It is charged with preparing
two planning documents. The first is a twenty-year regional conindependently undertakes conservation measures, id. § 6(h)(l)(A), 16 U.S.C. §
839d(h)(1)(A), and to provide technical and financial assistance, id. § 6(e), 16
U.S.C. § 839d(e). In acquiring other types of resources, the agency can either
acquire the output of the resource or grant billing credits to a customer whose
acquisition of a resource reduces BPA's obligations under section five. Id. §
6(b)(2), (h)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(b)(2), (h)(l)(B).
If BPA is unable to acquire sufficient resources to meet its obligations under
section five, it has three alternatives. First, if the shortages are short term, the
agency can either draw on its reserves or make short-term purchases from out of
the region. The most important reserve available to the agency is the top quartile
of power sold to the DSIs, which is freely interruptible. Second, BPA's authority
under the Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act to make purchases
"to meet temporary deficiencies," 16 U.S.C. § 838i(b)(6)(i) (1982), has effectively been limited to purchases lasting no more than five years. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act §§ 3(12), 5(c), 16 U.S.C. §§
839a(12), 839c(c) (1982).
Finally, if BPA is unable to acquire sufficient resources to meet its obligations,
and shortages cannot be remedied through reserves or Transmission Act
purchases, the agency can declare insufficiency and thus reduce its obligations to
supply power. While PNEPPCA restricts BPA's authority to declare insufficiency, e.g., id. § 5(b)(5), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b)(5), it does not deny BPA this
option. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. 30,181-84 (1980) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
See generally Mellem, supra note 28; Michie, supra note 28.
"' See generally infra notes 43-68 and accompanying text.
82 126 CONG. REc. 27,819 (1980) (statement of Rep. Swift).
33 See Pacific Northwest Electric Power Supply and Conservation Act, 1979:
Hearings on S. 2080 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 523-28 (1978) (statement of Montana Governor
Judge); id. at 626-42 (statement of Idaho Governor Evans).
" Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 4(a)(2),
16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2) (1982). The size of the Council was a hotly disputed
issue. Idaho and Montana sought a small council (4-5 members) with clear political accountability to each state's governor. Washington, on the other hand,
sought a proportionally weighted council, perhaps because it has almost half the
region's population. A compromise was eventually struck and added to the bill in
the House Interior Committee. Hemingway, supra note 14, at 673 n.2.
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servation and electric power plan (the Plan)."3 The Plan is to contain a schedule for implementing conservation measures and developing additional generating capacity to meet regional electric
loads.3 6 The second planning document is "a program to protect,
mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife" resources and habitat
(the Program).3 7 The Program is to redress the historic imbalance
between power and fish in the Basin.3 8
PNEPPCA thus sought to alleviate the region's apparent
shortages by reallocating existing supplies and by increasing
BPA's authority to acquire conservation and output of generating
facilities. In addition, the Act sought to allay fears that the BPA
Administrator would become an "energy czar" as a result of her
expanded authority.3 9 It did so by balancing the expanded federal
role with an expanded state role. Given the pivotal position of energy planning to the state siting responsibilities over energy

projects, a state-appointed planning council was a necessary check
on BPA's authority: "The states feared that without a regional
planning authority responsible to the states, BPA's decisions on
what new generating plants should be built would simply overPacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 4(d)(1),
16 U.S.C. § 839b(d)(l) (1982). The Council voted to adopt a regional conservation and electric power plan on April 27, 1983. See 1 NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1983 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC POWER PLAN

at i. The formal adoption occurred on June 1, 1983. See 48 Fed. Reg. 24,493
(1983). The Plan was amended on January 23, 1986. See I NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL, 1986 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC POWER
PLAN.
6 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 4(e)(2),

16 U.S.C. § 839b(e)(2) (1982).
37 Id. § 4(h)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A). The Council adopted the
required fish and wildlife program on November 15, 1982. See NORTHWEST
POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM at i (1982). The Program was amended on October 10, 1984. See id.

(rev. ed. 1984).
See generally Blumm, supra note 18; Blumm, Promising a Process for Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act and
Anadromous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497 (1981); Goble, supra note 18;
Wilkinson & Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and
Allocation of a Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32 U. KAN. L. REV.
17 (1983).
S* The "energy czar" concern was a common refrain in the House debates
where the state-appointed Council was added to the bill. See, e.g., 126 CONG.
REC. 27,818, 27,828 (1980) (statements of Rep. Swift); id. at 27,815 (statement
of Rep. Dingell); id. at 27,812-13 (statement of Rep. Lujan).
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whelm the state planning and siting process.' '40 It is this balancing
of state and federal interests through the Council which has raised

constitutional questions. 41
Before reaching these constitutional claims, however, there is a
threshold issue: what authority does the Council exercise in relation to BPA? If the Council has merely the authority to recommend that BPA pursue certain actions, its structure is constitutionally irrelevant: state bodies can suggest federal action without
creating constitutional difficulties. Constitutional questions are
raised only if the Council has mandatory authority over federal
conduct. The challenge to the constitutionality of the Council thus
4
is contingent upon its relationship with BPA. 2
2.

The Council and BPA: The Constitutional Dimension

The relationship between the Council and BPA is a major
theme in PNEPPCA. The Act requires BPA to act "in a manner"
consistent with" the council's Plan and Program. 43 This require40 Hemingway, supra note 14, at 679; see also H.R. REp. No. 976, 96th

Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 78, reprinted in 1980 U.S.

CODE CONG.

&

ADMIN.

NEWS 6023, 6069.
41 See H.R. REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 40, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6023, 6038; 126 CONG. REC. 27,820 (1980)
(statement of Rep. Swift); Pacific Legal Foundation Brief, supra note 4, at 8-36;
Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 49-55; Petitioners' Reply Brief,
supra note 7, at 21-36.
'2 Throughout this article the consistency requirement is discussed in terms of
conditioning BPA's authority. While BPA is the dominant federal actor, some of
the consistency requirements are equally applicable to the federal agencies which
either operate the Federal Columbia River Power System, i.e., the Army Corps
of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, or regulate the nonfederal projects
which are part of the regional system, i.e., the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See, e.g., Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act § 4(h)(ll)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(ll)(A) (1982).
43 PNEPPCA contains general provisions requiring BPA to use its statutory
authorities to protect fish and wildlife "in a manner consistent with" the Plan
and the Program, id. § 4(h)(10)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A), and requiring
resource acquisition decisions to be consistent with the Plan. Id. § 4(d)(2), 16
U.S.C. § 839b(d)(2); see also id. § 6(a)(1), (f)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(a)(1),
(f)(1) (iterating the general requirement that resources be acquired only when
"consistent with the plan").
PNEPPCA is only one of several statutes adopted by Congress that impose
"consistency" requirements on federal property managers. For example, the
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982), requires federal agencies conducting activities directly affecting the coastal zone to
do so "in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with
approved state management programs." Id. § 1456(c)(1); see also id. §
1456(c)(2), (c)(3)(A)-(B), (d). Under CZMA, discretionary federal activities
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ment significantly restricts the federal agency's conduct in two
ways. First, the Act denies the agency the authority to make commitments unilaterally either to acquire major new resources or to
sell electricity to new large load customers. Second, the Act au-

thorizes the Council to make its own consistency determinations
and to force BPA to respond to the Council's decisions.
PNEPPCA imposes stringent consistency provisions when BPA

seeks to acquire a "major resource," which the Act defines as a
source of electricity or conservation with a capacity of more than
fifty megawatts to be acquired for more than five years." Before
acquiring such a resource, BPA must provide the public an opportunity to participate in evaluating the proposal and to make a
written consistency determination. 5 If BPA determines that the

proposal is inconsistent with the Plan but that the resource is
nonetheless needed to meet the agency's electricity supply obligations, the acquisition requires specific congressional approval."' If
BPA concludes that the acquisition proposal is consistent with the
occurring on federal lands are exempt from direct state regulation. 16 U.S.C. §
1453(1); see Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 590 F. Supp.
1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir.

1985), appeal docketed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1986) (No. 85-1200).
Such federal actions are, however, subject to a consistency requirement if they
directly affect the coastal zone. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S.
312, 323 (1984). Similarly, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1353 (1982), prohibits the Secretary of the Interior from issuing permits
to explore the lands lying on the outer continental shelf unless the coastal state
agrees that the exploration is consistent with its coastal zone management plan,
or the Secretary of Commerce determines that the exploration is "in the interest
of national security." Id. § 1340(c)(2). The same procedures are applicable if the
Secretary of the Interior proposes to permit actual oil and gas development. Id. §
1351(d). Finally, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§
1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), prohibits certain land transfers unless they
are consistent with "State and local government land use plans and programs."
Id. § 1721(c)(1).
" Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 3(12),
16 U.S.C. § 839a(12) (1982).
,I The agency is required to provide notice to the public, the Council, the
Governors of the four regional states, and the agency's customers. Id. §
6(c)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(c)(l)(A). BPA is to hold at least one public hearing at least sixty days after the notice, create a record to assist in evaluating the
proposal, and render a written decision which must include a consistency determination. This decision is to be made public and provided to the Council. Id. §
6(c)(l)(B)-(D), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(c)(I)(B)-(D).
46 BPA must make formal findings that the resource is needed to meet its
statutory obligations, and may acquire the resource only when "the expenditure
of funds . . . has been specifically authorized by Act of Congress." Id.

6(c)(3)(A), (B), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(c)(3)(A), (B).

§
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Plan, the Council may nonetheless prevent the acquisition by determining that it is, in fact, inconsistent. 47 Once the Council has
determined that the proposal is inconsistent, the resource may be
acquired only if Congress authorizes the expenditure of the necessary funds.48 BPA thus is able to acquire a major resource without
specific Congressional approval only when both the agency and
the Council agree that the resource is consistent with the Plan.
The agency is similarly restricted when it attempts to make a
major commitment of resources. PNEPPCA prohibits BPA from
increasing the amount of electricity it sells to a DSI without the
Council's concurrence that the sale is consistent with the Plan."
The prohibition on additional sales to DSIs works with the restrictions on acquisition of major resources since the agency will be
unable to justify inconsistent resource acquisitions by increasing
its contractual obligations.
The Act does grant BPA some flexibility to meet unexpected
demands or to take advantage of unexpected resources.
PNEPPCA authorizes the agency to acquire an inconsistent
nonmajor resource under certain circumstances. Importantly,
however, BPA is required to find that the acquisition, although
inconsistent with the Plan, is nonetheless consistent with the statutory criteria embodied in the Plan.5 0 Since the Act allows the
Council to review the Plan as seldom as every five years, 51 BPA's
Id. § 6(c)(2), (3), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(c)(2), (3).
Following the Council's inconsistency determination, the proposal can proceed only if the BPA Administrator finds that the acquisition is required to meet
contractual obligations under the Act. The proposal is then reported to Congress
for its decision. Id. § 6(c)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(c)(3).
" Id. § 5(d)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(3). In addition to the concurrence of the
Council, the sale cannot be made until the agency concludes that (a) additional
reserves are needed to assure firm loads, (b) the sale to a DSI is an economical
means of providing the reserve, (c) the reserve cannot be created by selling to the
DSI through a utility, and (d) the agency can acquire sufficient electricity to
serve the load. Id. § 5(d)(3)(A)-(D), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(3)(A)-(D).
80 Id. § 6(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(b)(2). The Act imposes two primary requirements. First, the resource must be "cost effective," a comparative term for
resources which are needed and less expensive than other available resources. Id.
§ 3(4)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839a(4)(A). Second, the Act establishes a priority
scheme: conservation, renewable resources, cogeneration and waste heat, and
conventional thermal resources such as coal and nuclear. Id. § 4(e)(1), 16 U.S.C.
§ 839b(e)(l). Conservation is not only the first priority resource, it also receives
a 10% cost-effectiveness bonus since such resources are deemed cost effective if
they are no more than 110% of the cost of the nonconservation resource. Id. §
3(4)(D), 16 U.S.C. § 839a(4)(D).
51 Id. § 4(d)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(d)(l).
47
41
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limited authority to acquire small or short-term resources will allow the region to take advantage of resources which might become
available between Plan revisions. 52 By limiting the size and duration of acquisitions and requiring them to be consistent with the
statutory criteria, the Act provides flexibility while minimizing the
effect on the Plan.
Finally, the Council is given independent authority to evaluate
the consistency of the BPA Administrator's actions under the
Plan."' If the agency refuses to act, PNEPPCA grants the Council
4
authority to force the Administrator to make a final decision.5
Since the Administrator's decision is reviewable on the consistency
standard, Congress effectively gave the Council the power to initiate judicial review of BPA's actions.
The Act thus embodies a coherent scheme that prohibits BPA
from independently making major commitments either to acquire
a resource or to provide additional electricity to a DSI. The Council's oversight role is further strengthened by the explicit grant of
authority to review BPA's actions and to initiate judicial review of
its conduct. The Act thus contains an explicit waiver of federal
supremacy: BPA is required to act consistently with plans produced by the state-appointed Council.
The Act's legislative history provides additional support for this
conclusion. The Council assumed its current form as a result of
amendments negotiated by the Governors of the regional states
and introduced in the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee by Representative Pat Williams. 55 Representative Williams
explained the purpose of the Council and its relationship to BPA
by noting that "It]he amendment provides for Council members
to be appointed by the Governors rather than by the Secretary of
Energy. Gubernatorial appointment will ensure regional control
over regional power matters and will provide a more meaningful
5,Nonmajor resources, because of their size or limited duration, may require
less than five years to move from conception to operation. In addition, during the
debate on the bill its proponents were quick to point out that it did not reduce
BPA's obligation under the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA). See
Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, § 210, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982).
Most projects which qualify under PURPA are nonmajor resources and thus
could be acquired if consistent with the statutory criteria of the Plan.
53 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 4(i), 16
U.S.C. § 839b(i) (1982).
Id. § 4(j), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(j).
11 See H.R. REP.No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 70, reprintedin 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6023, 6063.
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check on the Bonneville Administrator. '56 Representative Williams also noted that a state-appointed council was necessary to
balance the expanded BPA authority and ensure "a strong, cooperative planning role for the states. '57 This idea of the Council as
a check or constraint on BPA, 58 and the Plan and the Program as
guiding the Administrator's conduct, 9 was a common refrain in
the debates leading to passage of the Act. The bill's proponents
argued that it would reduce the power of the federal government
in regional energy planning:
[This] bill lets the Northwest States guide BPA's actions: Rarely
does the Congress step back from increased federalization, but in
this bill it is the Northwest States that will, for the first time, be
given an opportunity and a mechanism for guiding BPA's exercise
of its new authorities. .

.

.The regional power plan, drafted by the

regional council, will be the map of the region's future energy
path. 60
The Act's legislative history thus reinforces the statutory language
and structure: in place of federal dominance, the Act was to shift
decision making to the people of the Northwest by requiring BPA
to act "in a manner consistent with" the Council's planning
decisions. 61
6"Id.; see also id. at 78, reprinted in 1980 U.S.

CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

at 6068.
Id. at 78, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6069.
s See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. 29,811 (1980) (statement of Rep. Dingell); id. at
29,805 (statement of Rep. Foley); id. at 27,828 (statement of Rep. Swift); id. at
27,819 (statement of Rep. Swift); id. at 27,815 (statement of Rep. Dingell).
51 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 33, 40, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6023, 6031, 6038; 126
CONG. REC. 29,801 (1980) (statement of Rep. Kazen); id. at 27,826 (statement
of Rep. Dicks); id. at 27,825 (statement of Rep. Bonker); id. at 27,816 (statement of Rep. Moorhead); id. at 27,809-10 (statement of Rep. Kazen).
" 126 CONG. REC. 27,819 (1980) (statement of Rep. Swift); see also id. at
29,802 (statement of Rep. Lujan).
61 See id. at 29,802 (statement of Rep. Lujan); id. at 27,818 (statement of
Rep. Swift); id. at 27,810 (statement of Rep. Ullman). Representative Bonker
went even further, arguing that under the Act, "[t]he regional power council will
have the authority in the development of the plant [sic] to actually instruct the
Bonneville Power Administrator to buy out WWPPS [sic] 3 and 5, and terminate them." Id. at 29,806 (statement of Rep. Bonker); cf. id. at 27,815 (statement of Rep. Pritchard) (the Council "will not only draw up the plan detailing
what the region's [energy] needs will be, it will have the authority to make sure
[BPA] adheres to the plan").
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The plain meaning of the term "consistent" is "not contradictory," or "marked by agreement. ' 62 BPA's conduct therefore is to
agree with and not contradict the Council's planning decisions.
The Council thus does not have the power to direct BPA. Nonetheless, the federal agency's authority to act is significantly restricted since its actions must conform to the Plan and the
Program."
This interpretation of the respective roles of the Council and
BPA is supported by decisions construing the consistency requirements in other federal statutes. For example, in reviewing the consistency provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA), ' 4 one court concluded:
Though I reject the notion that Congress intended to give the states
an absolute "veto power" over federal action in the coastal zone, I
believe it is manifest from the fact of the statute that Congress did
intend to cede some authority in matters of coastal development to
the affected states in order to achieve cooperative and coordinated
development of scarce natural resources. The requirement of consistency with federally-approved state coastal
zone management
5
programs is not one to be dismissed lightly.
Another court decided that "consistency" requires a determination "that the activity will be carried out in a manner which conforms with the state program."6 6 Since the consistency requirement in CZMA is limited by the phrase "to the maximum extent
6 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

279 (rev. 5th ed. 1979); WEBSTER'S

484 (unabridged ed. 1981).

The Council's authority over BPA is of two types. First, PNEPPCA itself
provides the Council with certain procedural mechanisms to force BPA to act in
accordance with the Plan and Program. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. Second, BPA is subject to federal judicial process at the insistence of
"[a] person ... adversely affected or aggrieved" by its conduct. Administrative
Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). In such situations, the courts are
"'

to determine whether the agency's actions are "not

. .

. in accordance with law."

Id. § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see, e.g., Columbia Basin Land Protection
Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 596 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 50-52.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982).
65 Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 576 (D. Mass.), affd
sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983).
" California ex rel. Brown v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1368 (C.D. Cal.
1981), arid, 683 F.2d 1253, 1263-66 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub

nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984); see also Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal.
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985), appeal docketed,

54 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1986) (No. 85-1200). For the current state of
judicial interpretations on the reach of the consistency provisions, see Dahl, Fed-
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practicable, ' ' 67 PNEPPCA's consistency mandate should be even
more expansively construed and BPA's authority concomitantly
restricted.
PNEPPCA thus authorizes the waiver of BPA's immunity from
nonfederal control by establishing a detailed structure that permits a state-appointed body to develop plans to which the agency
must conform. As one Council member has noted, "[slomewhere
along the continuum between directive and advisory lies the meaning of 'consistent with the plan.' "8 Regardless of precisely where
the point lies, PNEPPCA does give the regional states, through
the Council, significant authority over BPA.
II
THE COUNCIL AND THE CONSTITUTION

Those challenging the constitutionality of PNEPPCA and the
Council contend that Congress cannot delegate such authority
over federal conduct to a body of state-appointed officers, arguing
that such oversight responsibilities may be exercised only by federal officers appointed by the executive branch. The homebuilders'
argument thus is that Congress may not constitutionally subject
federal executive officers to the control of state-appointed officers.
In short, some activities may constitutionally be performed only
by federal officers appointed in compliance with the appointments
clause.
As applied to PNEPPCA and the Council, the argument involves two contentions. The first focuses on the constitutional. status of the Council. The challengers argue that the Council is not
actually an interstate compact agency because it does not comply
with the constitutional requirements for creating such a body.
Rather, it is a federal agency with state-appointed officers." This
is unconstitutional, the challengers contend, because it subjects
federal executive authority to officers not appointed by the execueral Consistency Under the Coastal Zone Management Act Revisited, 5
COASTAL L. MEMO 1 (1986).

16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982).
Hemingway, supra note 14, at 691. The Act's scheme indicates that the
point varies with the magnitude of BPA's proposed action. See supra notes 44-52
and accompanying text.
O Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1371-73 (Beezer, J., dissenting); see
also Petitioners' Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 27-29.
07
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tive branch. The first question thus is the constitutional status of
the Council: Is it an interstate compact agency or a federal
agency administered by state-appointed officials?
In addition, the homebuilders argue that even if the Council is
a constitutionally created interstate compact agency, its members
nonetheless must be appointed in compliance with the appointments clause because the compact clause "is not an exception to
the Appointments Clause."7 0 This second argument ultimately
turns upon the characterization of the Council's authority. Those
challenging the Council's constitutionality argue that its authority
is of a type which can only be exercised by "Officers of the United
States."'71 Thus, for the challengers, the constitutionality of the
Council ultimately depends upon characterizing the type of authority exercised by its members. Portraying that authority as
"significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States,'7 2 they conclude that only federal officers may exercise
such authority and that the Council is therefore unconstitutional
73
since its members are not federally appointed.
A. The Interstate Compact Clause
The Northwest Power Planning Council was initially proposed
by the Governors of the four regional states.7 4 The Governors negotiated the Council's final formulation which was introduced on
Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1375 (Beezer, J.,
dissenting); Petitioners' Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 29-30.
71 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; infra text accompanying note 119.
78 Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1375 (Beezer, J., dissenting) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976)); see also Petitioners' Opening Brief,
supra note 4, at 52-55; Petitioners' Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 29-33.
78 See infra notes 118-49 and accompanying text.
74 See Pacific Northwest Electric Power Supply and Conservation Act, 1979:
Hearings on S. 2080 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 523-28 (1978) (statement of Governor Judge); id.
at 626-42 (statement of Governor Evans); Hemingway, supra note 14, at 678.
In their attempts to increase the formal requirements, the opponents of the
Council ignore this crucial bit of history, preferring to continually refer to the
Council as a federal creation. See Pacific Legal Foundation Brief, supra note 4,
at 33-34; Petitioners' Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 27-29. As the Supreme Court
has frequently stated, however, "[t]he terms 'agreement' or 'compact' taken by
themselves are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all forms of stipulation,
written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of subjects." Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1893). The letter from the four Governors is itself an
agreement under the constitutional standard announced in Virginia v. Tennessee.
70
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their behalf as amendments to the bill in the House Interior Committee.7 5 The amendments were adopted and the Act as approved
gives congressional consent to the agreement of the region's Governors. PNEPPCA provides: "[tihe consent of Congress is given
for an agreement . . . pursuant to which . . . there shall be established a regional agency to be known as the 'Pacific Northwest

Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council.'

",78

Each of

the regional states has subsequently adopted legislation formally

ratifying the compact."
The compact clause provides that "[no State shall, without the
Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact

with another State."

8

The Constitution thus imposes no proce-

dural or substantive requirements beyond congressional approval
of "any agreement or compact" between states. Indeed, the clause

is so lacking in formal requirements that the Supreme Court has
stated that the agreement between the states need not even be

reduced to a writing: "The terms 'agreement' or 'compact' taken
by themselves are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all forms
of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of sub-

jects.

'79

As a result of the absence of formal requirements, the

75 See H.R. REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 70, reprintedin 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6023, 6063. See generally Hemingway,
supra note 14, at 673 n.2, 678-80 (discussing the negotiations and the compromises required); Hemingway Retrospective, supra note 1, at 4-7. One of the
recurring refrains in the debates leading to the passage of the bill containing the
Council as a compact agency was the statement that the "bill embodies a regionally negotiated" solution. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 29,802 (1980) (statement of
Rep. Dicks); see also id. at 27,812 (statement of Rep. Lujan).
70 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 4(a)(2),
16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2) (1982). The Act also provides that appointment of
Council members by three states "shall constitute an agreement by the States
establishing the Council and such agreement is hereby consented to by the Congress." Id.
7 See IDAHO CODE § 61-1202 (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-4-402
(1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 469.805 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.52A.030
(Supp. 1986); see also Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 4(a)(2)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2)(B) (1982) (providing for ratification through appointment of Council members within six months).
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
70 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1893); cf Holmes v. Jennison,
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571-72 (1840) (considering terms "treaty," "agreement,"
and "compact"). While the terms are very broad, not all interstate agreements
fall within the clause and require congressional approval. The only agreements
that require congressional approval are those that "may tend to increase and
build up the political influence of the contracting States, so as to encroach upon
or impair the supremacy of the United States or interfere with their rightful
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Court has deferred to Congress, recognizing that the clause involves questions of political accommodation between the federal
and state governments. Thus the Court has consistently followed
the principle that Congress is the proper body to determine what
form its consent will take: "[t]he constitution makes no provision
respecting the mode or form in which the consent of congress is to
be signified, very properly leaving that matter to the wisdom of
that body." 80
Two corollaries of this general principle are particularly relevant to the constitutional challenge to the Northwest Power Planning Council: Congress may give its consent in advance of state
action,8 1 and may grant its consent conditionally. 2 Despite the asserted novelty of the procedures creating the Council 83 examples
of both advance and conditional congressional consent are

common.
Since at least 1911," Congress has enacted statutes providing
advance consent to compacts on a variety of subjects. These invitations to interstate cooperation have applied to regulation of interstate electricity,8 5 flood control, 8 6 tobacco production,8 7 parks
management of particular subjects placed under their entire control." Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 518. As the Court subsequently noted, "[t]he relevant
inquiry must be one of impact on our federal structure." United States Steel
Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978); see also New
Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976). See generally Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When Is a Compact Not a Compact?, 64
MICH. L. REV. 63 (1965).

" Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 85-86 (1823). The question, the
Court said, is whether Congress has, "by some positive act, in relation to such
agreement, signified the consent of that body to its validity." Id. at 86. Thus the
Court found consent to be implied from subsequent actions of Congress which
were inconsistent with a lack of consent. Id.; see also Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S.
155, 173 (1894); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 525 (1893).
11 Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 441 (1981); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148
U.S. 503, 521 (1893).
S Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. at 439-40; Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 281-82 n.7 (1959); James v. Dravo Constructing Co.,
302 U.S. 134, 148 (1937); Tobin v, United States, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962).
" See Pacific Legal Foundation Brief, supra note 4, at 28-33; Petitioners' Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 27-29.
" See Weeks Law, Pub. L. No. 61-435, § 1, 36 Stat. 961 (1911) (codified at
16 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)).
" Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 66-280, § 20, 41 Stat. 1063, 1073 (1920)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 813 (1982)); see Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 124 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 663
(1942).
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and parkways, 88 crime prevention, 89 forest fires,90 fisheries, 91 and
radioactive waste management.92 In most of these cases, Congress
was responding to state actions; the tobacco production compact,
for example, was the result of a Virginia statute.93 This has not,
however, uniformly been the case. For instance, Congress adopted
a statute providing advance consent to the formation of compacts
between states "for the purpose of conserving the forests and the
water supply of the States, '9 4 even though at the time there were

no negotiations on the subject among the states.95
Examples of conditional consent are also common. Perhaps the
most celebrated instance is the Boulder Canyon Project Act. 96 In

consenting to the Colorado River Compact of 1922, Congress imposed several conditions on the agreement, including changes in
the procedure for state ratification.9 7 When Arizona subsequently
88 Flood Control Act of June 22, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, § 4, 49 Stat.
1570, 1571 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701d (1982)).
87 Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 74-534, § 1, 49 Stat. 1239 (1936) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 515 (1982)).
" Act of June 23, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-7701h, 49 Stat. 1894, 1895 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 17m (1982)).
81 Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-293, 48 Stat. 909 (codified as amended
at 4 U.S.C. § 112 (1982)).
90 Act of June 25, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-128, 63 Stat. 271, repealed by Act of
June 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-307, § 8(a), 92 Stat. 353, 356.
91 H.R.J. Res. 302, 54 Stat. 261 (1940) (codified at Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 667a (1982)).
92Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-240, § 4, 99 Stat. 1842, 1845-46 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d
(1982)).
9 See generally F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT
SINCE 1925, 57-58 & n.219 (1951).
Weeks Law, Pub. L. No. 61-435, § 1, 36 Stat. 961 (1911) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 552 (1982)).
91

F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 93, at 57. Pacific Legal Foun-

dation argues that "[wihile the ... procedure [for adopting compacts] does not
necessarily require interstate negotiations prior to the formation of a compact, it
does require at least one state to develop an arrangement which can then be
accepted by other states." Pacific Legal Foundation Brief, supra note 4, at 29.
Since neither the Constitution nor any court case has imposed this requirement,
it is not surprising that the Foundation's attorneys are unable to cite any authority for this proposition. But see Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 124 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 663 (1942)
(construing section twenty of the Federal Power Act as authorization for compacts regulating interstate electricity rates); P.

HARDY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS

17 (1982).
96 Pub. L. No. 70-642, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617617t (1982)).
Id. § 13, 45 Stat. at 1064 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 617c (1982)).
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challenged the constitutionality of the Act and the compact, the

Court noted the conditions imposed in the statute granting consent
to the compact and held the statute and compact constitutional.

8

Federal involvement in the formation of other compacts has
been pervasive. In granting advance consent to a compact on the

Republican River, for example, Congress conditioned its consent
upon the inclusion of a federal participant in the negotiations. 9
Such involvement has been a common feature.100 While many of
the federal statutes have been little more than consent to agreements on general topics, others have included detailed specifica-

tions of terms and conditions. 01 For example, Congress has recently granted advance consent to the formation of interstate
compacts for regional disposal of low-level radioactive waste as

part of a complex regulatory scheme.102
The lack of formal constitutional requirements beyond congres-

sional consent and the concomitant judicial recognition that com98 See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 448, 464 (1931); see also Arizona
v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 345 (1934) (noting the conditional congressional
consent); P. HARDY, supra note 95, at 18-19.
" Act of Aug. 4, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-696, 56 Stat. 736.
100 See, e.g., Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat.
1509 (1970) (federal commissioners to sit on interstate regulatory body); Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961) (same);
S.J. Res. 76-222, 54 Stat. 748 (1940) (same); Act of May 31, 1939, Pub. L. No.
76-96, 53 Stat. 785 (federal participation in compact negotiations); Act of Aug.
19, 1921, Pub, L. No. 67-56, § 1, 42 Stat. 171 (congressional consent to the

initial negotiations for a Colorado River compact "upon condition" that a federal
representative participate in the negotiations); see also Seawright v. Stokes, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 151, 166 (1845); Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-Operative Federalism, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 825, 840-50 (1963).
101 See supra notes 85-92. The Pacific Legal Foundation would again raise a
general pattern of conduct into a hard constitutional rule, suggesting that the
Council is somehow constitutionally infirm because of the specificity of the federal legislation. See Pacific Legal Foundation Brief, supra note 4, at 32. Similarly, the homebuilders contend that there simply was too much federal involvement in the creation of the Council. Petitioners' Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 2829. There is no warrant, however, for such restrictions on Congress and the
states in the Constitution. There similarly is no support for the conclusion in the
history of interstate compacts. As Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives, noted, the history is one of an "increasing federal role in interstate compacts, not only at the approval level, as
required by the Constitution, but also at the levels of negotiation, administration,
and most recently, full membership and participation." Celler, Congress, Compact, and Interstate Authorities, 26 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS, 682, 683 (1961).
102 See generally Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d
(1982)); Comment, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compacts, 5 VA. J.
NAT. RESOURcEs L. 383 (1986).
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pacts are largely political adjustments between the states and
Congress have combined to produce a variety of agreements.108
The Northwest Power Planning Council is another example of this
tradition of flexibility and ad hoc adjustment.
Seeking to avoid this result, those challenging the constitutionality of the Council argue that it is not actually a compact agency.
This argument is predicated upon the conclusion that "the Coun14
cil lacks several of the classic indicia of an interstate compact," "
a conclusion that draws upon dicta in a recent Supreme Court
case, Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors.1 05 In Northeast Bancorp, the Court was concerned with two state statutes
which imposed reciprocity requirements and similar regional limitations on interstate bank acquisitions. Although noting the similarities in the statutes and the fact that there was "evidence of
cooperation among legislators, officials, bankers and others in the
two States in studying the idea and lobbying for the statutes," the
Court nonetheless expressed "some doubt" that the reciprocal
statutes were an interstate compact because "several of the classic
indicia of a compact [were] missing."' 0 The missing indicia included the lack of a joint organization, the fact that each state
remained free to modify its statute, and the divergence in statutory terms. The Court, however, concluded that even if the statutes amounted to a compact, it was not the type of agreement
which violated the compact clause because it did not increase the
political power of the states involved.' 07
Applying these factors to PNEPPCA, the challengers conclude
that it also lacks the indicia of a compact. Although the Council is
108 See

generally

R. LEACH

& R.

SUGG, THE ADMINISTRATION

STATE COMPACTS (1959); F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL,

OF INTER-

supra note 93.

101 Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Con-

servation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1372 (Beezer, J., dissenting); see also
Petitioners Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 27-29 & n.20.
10105 S. Ct. 2545, 2554 (1985). The case arose from the application by three
banks to the Federal Reserve Board for approval of their proposals to acquire
banks located in other states. Under the applicable federal law, the Board could
approve the acquisitions only if the state in which the bank to be purchased was
located reciprocally authorized the acquisition of out-of-state banks. The applications were opposed by other banks who contended, inter alia, that the state statutes purporting to authorize the acquisitions were in fact interstate compacts
which had not been consented to by Congress and thus were unconstitutional.
The challenge was predicated upon the fact that the statute involved required
reciprocity and imposed regional limitations.
10N Id.
107

Id. at 2554-55.
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a regional organization, its opponents argue that none of the regional states conditioned their participation on action by the other
states and thus may unilaterally repeal their statutes, and that the
Act lacks "the most important indicia of an interstate compact
agency: a state purpose."108 These arguments, however, ignore the
broad congressional authority under the interstate compact clause
and seek to impose restrictions not found in the constitutional text.
For example, the question of whether a state is free to withdraw
unilaterally from an interstate compact is an issue which the Supreme Court has specifically refused to decide. In West Virginia
ex rel. Dyer v. Sims,1°" the West Virginia Supreme Court held
that that state's participation in the Ohio River Valley Water
Sanitation Compact violated the West Virginia Constitution. On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the United States
urged that the compact be read to allow unilateral withdrawal,
while the other member states argued that withdrawal was precluded once congressional consent to the compact had been obtained. 1 Refusing to decide the broad issue, the Court nonetheless concluded that compacts cannot be "unilaterally nullified, or
given final meaning by an organ of one" of the compacting
states.""' At a minimum, the decision suggests that an explicit
agreement prohibiting unilateral withdrawal is not a necessary
108 Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1373 (Beezer, J., dissenting). Judge
Beezer also argues that the Council is not an interstate compact because it has
effect beyond the boundaries of the regional states. Beyond the mere assertion
that such extra-regional effect would be impossible "[i]f the Council [were] truly
an interstate compact agency," id. at 1372, he provides no reason for limiting
interstate compact agencies to solely regional effects. Indeed, interstate water
compacts frequently have effects beyond the member states' boundaries. For example, the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact joined Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia in a regional effort to maintain the Ohio River Basin's waters in a sanitary condition.
See Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, Pub. L. No. 76-739, 54 Stat.
752 (1940). The compact affects the downstream states of Arkansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee, none of which are represented in the compact. In reviewing the Ohio River compact, however, the Supreme Court did not
suggest that the exclusion of the lower Mississippi River states was a fatal flaw.
West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951). Judge Beezer's extraterritorial restriction thus is a spurious requirement that is not present in either the
constitutional text or the caselaw construing that text.
1 9 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
110 Id. at 28.
"I Id.

The Council and the Constitution

precondition for a valid compact since no such agreement was present in the challenged compact. "'
Similarly, the purported "state purpose" requirement is unwarranted. First, interstate compacts have been used in situations
where individual states are incapable of resolving a problem. Since
the problem is a regional one, a regional response is required. The
state purpose requirement as developed by the challengers is inherently inconsistent with an underlying rationale for compacts.
Second, there is a state purpose in the challenged compact. In
addition to the control over energy planning granted to the states
through the Council, the interstate cooperation in the protection
of the anadromous fish resources within the basin is a sufficient
state purpose."' Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the
interstate compact mechanism is a preferable solution to "awkward and unsatisfactory" litigation for the allocation of similar
regional resources."" Since the Federal Columbia River Power
System's dams seriously affect the migration of these fish," 5 the
state's involvement in the operation of the power system through
the Council's fish and wildlife program assists in achieving an important state goal. Finally, there is simply no basis in the text of
the Constitution, the caselaw construing that text, or the history
of the uses of interstate compacts to support the imposition of a
"state purpose" requirement.
The variety of objectives and administrative structures which
have been established under the compact clause renders the challengers' search for a list of necessary elements the search for a
will-o'-the-wisp. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed,
the compact clause provides "a supple device for dealing with in"" The compact itself is silent on the right to withdraw. See Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, Pub. L. No. 76-739, 54 Stat. 752 (1940). If
there were a prohibition on unilateral withdrawal, it would be the result of compacting rather than an indicia of a compact. The challengers have stood the case
law on its head.
18 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized "the legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild animals." Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). The joint regulation of fishing by Oregon and Washington is the basis of the Columbia River Compact, Pub. L. No. 65-123, 40 Stat.
515 (1918).
14 West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. at 27; cf. Idaho ex rel. Evans
v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983) (original action for equitable apportionment of
anadromous fish spawning in the Columbia River Basin).
"" For discussions of the effect of the dams and their operation on the anadromous fish runs in the Basin, see generally Blumm, supra note 18; Goble, supra
note 18.
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terests confined within a region." 11 6 Thus, the argument that the
Council is not a true compact agency misperceives the roles of
Congress and the Court. It seeks to introduce formalities and requirements which neither the Constitution nor the Court has
found necessary; it would reduce the flexibility which has been the
hallmark of interstate compacts. As one influential article noted,
"[t]he framers

. . .

astutely created a mechanism of legal control

over affairs that are projected beyond State lines and yet may not
call for, nor be capable of, national treatment. They allowed inter17
state adjustments but duly safeguarded the national interest."
Such is the case with the Northwest Power Planning Council.
PNEPPCA establishes a balance between regional concerns with
power planning and anadromous fish resources on the one hand,
and the federal interest in managing its property on the other.
Both regional and federal interests are safeguarded through political accommodation which the courts have been unwilling to second guess. The challenge to the Council under the compact clause
ultimately is based on a list of restrictions that neither the constitutional text nor the cases explicating that text contain.
B.

The Appointments Clause

Those questioning the constitutionality of PNEPPCA contend
that its constitutional problems extend beyond the compact clause,
arguing that it is unconstitutional even if it is a validly created
interstate compact. This second challenge hinges upon the appointments clause of the Constitution, which specifies the method
through which "all . . .Officers of the United States" are to be

appointed.118 Thus, if-the members of the Council are officers of
the United States, they must be appointed in compliance with the
clause. Since they were not so appointed, the conclusion that they
are federal officers would necessitate the further conclusion that
the Council is unconstitutional. The definition of the term is the
crucial question: Who is an "officer of the United States"?
West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. at 27.
Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 695 (1925); see also West Virginia
ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. at 27-28; State Amici Brief, supra note 4, at 7-23;
Grad, supra note 100.
"0 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See generally Petitioners' Opening Brief,
supra note 4, at 52; Petitioners' Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 21-36.
116
17
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1.

Officers of the United States: Development of the Law

The language of the clause itself provides little guidance in determining who is an officer of the United States, merely specifying
that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by
law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments."1 '
The clause allocates the power to appoint among the branches of
the federal government; it does not define the scope of that power.
The debates during the drafting of the Constitution are similarly opaque. The drafters were concerned with the locus of the
power to appoint, rather than the objects of the power; the lan110U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. Not only is the clause unhelpful, its text
raises a host of questions. For example, does the clause provide the only constitutional method for appointing individuals employed by the federal government
other than those whose appointment is specifically covered in the Constitution?
Are there employees of the federal government who are not officers of the United
States? Who are heads of departments? Are they officers, inferior officers, or
neither? Are "inferior Officers" and "all other Officers" mutually exclusive categories? Is the distinction between the two classes substantive or is it a decision
reserved by the clause to Congress? Does Congress have unlimited discretion to
vest the power to appoint inferior officers in any branch it chooses?
Such questions are of more than academic interest since the various possibilities produce divergent institutional arrangements. For example, if "all other Officers" and "inferior Officers" are mutually exclusive categories some basis for
distinguishing between the categories is required. One method that draws support from the constitutional text is to conclude that it is for Congress, "as they
think proper," to decide the issue. An alternative approach is to treat the two
terms as objective categories in need of definition. Under the former, Congress
and the President decide; under the latter, it is for the Supreme Court. See gen-

erally Comment, Abolition of Federal Offices as an Infringement on the President's Power to Remove Federal Executive Officers.- A Reassessment of Constitutional Doctrines, 42 FORD. L. REv. 562, 601-08 (1974) (arguing that the

distinction is substantive and restricts congressional power to delegate appointment authority).
The text thus poses, but does not resolve, the question of how "Officer of the
United States" is defined. The term's definition has also proved to be problematic
in nonconstitutional contexts. See Hurley, Who is an "Officer" for Purposes of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Colby v. Klune Revisited, 44 FORD. L.
REv. 489 (1975). For a discerning examination of the appointments clause, see
generally Burkoff, Appointment and Removal under the Federal Constitution:
The Impact of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 1335, 1336-79 (1976).
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guage reflects a compromise between those who sought to have the
power vested in a strong executive who, they argued, would make
better selections than the more political legislature, and those who
preferred to have the power lodged in the more democratic Congress because they feared that a strong President would become
autocratic. 120 There is, therefore, no discussion of who is an officer
or whether all individuals working for the federal government
were to be officers of the United States. As one commentator has
noted, the debates at best demonstrate a "concern with crafting
an appointments system checking the tendency of either the Congress or the President toward administrative hegemony. 121
The case law also provides little guidance. There have been few
cases construing the clause; those which have are generally conclusory and often inconsistent. The courts have followed two distinguishable approaches. Under the first, they have treated the
term as having an objective content and have attempted to define
it. Under the second, the status of the individual has depended
upon the procedures under which she was employed; if the procedure satisfied the formal requirements for appointing either an inferior officer or a noninferior officer, the individual was an officer
of the United States. The decision on the status of the position, in
short, was for the President and Congress.
While these two approaches may not be logically inconsistent,
they do spring from fundamentally divergent views of the respective roles of the courts and the political branches. Unfortunately,
the same case frequently has elements of both positions. For example, in United States v. Hartwell,1 2 2 the first case to examine
120 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787 63, 119-121, 128,

232-33, 292 (1911); 2 id. at 33, 41-44, 80-83, 389, 405-06, 538-40, 627-28, 639;
see also L. MARTIN, GENUINE INFORMATION (1787), reprinted in 3 id. at 172,
218. See generally J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 17-25

(1953).
121 Burkoff, supra note 119, at 1342; see also Note, Power of Appointment to
Public Office under the Federal Constitution, 42 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1929).
121 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1867). Hartwell did not strictly involve the appointments clause. Hartwell, employed as a clerk in the office of an assistant
treasurer in Boston, was indicted for embezzlement under a statute applicable to
officers of the United States. Hartwell's attorneys argued that he was not an
officer, but merely a clerk, which they contended was a "subordinate and assistant to the officer, and performs such services as he directs." Id. at 391. The
statute, they contended, thus did not apply to their client. Despite the fact that
the case presented an issue of statutory construction rather than constitutional
law, the case is generally treated as the first case bearing on the appointments
clause.
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the definition of "officer," the Court held that Hartwell was an
inferior officer under both approaches. First, it defined the term
"office" as "a public station, or employment, conferred by the appointment of government. The term embraces the ideas of tenure,
duration, emolument, and duties." 2 3 It then applied this definition
to Hartwell's position as a Treasury Department clerk, noting that
he was employed under a statute which specified the number of
clerks to be employed and the salaries they were to receive. Given
these facts, the Court concluded he was an officer because he
"was appointed pursuant to law, and his compensation was fixed
by law. . . .His duties
were continuing and permanent, not occa124
sional or temporary.'

The Court, however, concluded that Hartwell was also an officer because he "was appointed by the head of a department
within the meaning of the constitutional provision upon the subject of the appointing power." ' Hartwell thus was an officer both
because of the formality of his employment and the nature of his
duties. While justice arguably was served, the analysis in the case
is of little assistance since the definition of "officer" apparently
applied to most permanent employees,12 and the explication of
123

Id. at 393.

124

Id.

12 Id. at 393-94 (footnote omitted). Hartwell was appointed under a statute
which "authorized the assistant treasurer, at Boston, with the approbation of the
Secretary of the Treasury, to appoint a specified number of clerks." Id. at 393. It
is unclear whether it was the approbation of the Secretary of the Treasury or the
appointment by the assistant treasurer which satisfied the constitutional requirement that inferior officers be appointed by the heads of departments.
While Hartwell contains both approaches, in United States v. Smith, 124 U.S.
525 (1888), the Court seemed to construe Hartwell as turning solely upon the
method of appointment:
His appointment . . . under the act of Congress could only be made with
the approbation of the Secretary of the Treasury. This fact, in the opinion
of the court, rendered his appointment one by the head of the department
within the constitutional provision upon the subject of the appointing
power.
Id. at 532.
120 Thus, where the statute under which the individual was employed authorized positions which were temporary, intermittent, or largely undefined, the employee was held not to be an officer. For example, a special merchant appraiser
employed to determine the value of an unusual cargo for customs, Auffmordt v.
Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 326-28 (1890), a special master appointed to hear one
case, United States ex rel. Lotsch v. Kelly, 86 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1936), and a
special agent of the Land Office, United States v. Schlierholz, 137 F. 616 (E.D.
Ark. 1905), were all held not to be officers due to the nature of their employment. The latter case demonstrates the type of analysis employed in this line of
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the formal requirements was conclusory. Nonetheless, Hartwell
was the basis for the leading decision during this period, United
12 7
States v. Germaine.

The Court began its analysis in Germaine by defining "officer"
tautologically as "all persons who can be said to hold an office
under the Government."1 28 The Court recognized that not all federal employees were officers, holding that the distinction between
officers and employees was the mode of employment. The Court

then examined Germaine's employment, concluded that the official who had appointed him to his post was not a head of a department, and held that he was therefore not an officer because

his appointment did not meet the Constitution's formal requirements.12 9 Just as in Hartwell, however, the Court concluded: "If
cases. The court reviewed the statute under which the individual had been appointed to determine what status Congress had intended, concluding that
[tihere is nothing in any of the acts under which defendant was employed
fixing the tenure, duration, emolument, and duties of his position. Whether
they shall be continuing and permanent, or occasional and intermittent,
what his duties shall consist of, what his compensation shall be, are all
dependent upon the will of the Secretary of the Interior ....

No regular

appropriation to pay his compensation is made, but it is paid out of the
general appropriation for the protection of timber and public lands. He is
but an agent or person employed by the Secretary, removable at his pleasure, to perform such duties at such times and at such places as may be
demanded of him. The Secretary may appoint one or one hundred persons
to do the same thing.
Id. at 621.
127 99 U.S. 508 (1878). The facts in Germaine were similar to those in Hartwell. Germaine was charged with extortion under a federal statute punishing
"[e]very officer of the United States." Id. at 509. The defendant's constitutional
status was again treated 'as determinative of his criminal liability.
I" Id. at 510. The Court sought to distinguish "officers" from "employees"
and "agents," noting in passing that "nine-tenths of the persons rendering service
to the government undoubtedly are [agents and employees] without thereby becoming its officers." Id. at 509. The Court thus decided with only passing comment that the appointments clause was not the sole method of employing federal
workers.
129 Id. at 510-11. The Court concluded that the phrase "heads of departments" applied only to cabinet-level officials and not to "inferior commissioners
and bureau officers, who are themselves mere aids and subordinates of the heads
of departments." Id. at 511. This conclusion was based upon the use of the term
"department" in the provision authorizing the President to require a written
opinion from "the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Since the President had never requested a written
report from officials such as the one who employed Germaine, the Court concluded that he was not the head of a department, and Germaine was therefore
not an officer of the United States. If, as the Court's analysis suggests, the President has the unilateral power to create heads of departments simply by requiring
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we look to the nature of defendant's employment, we think it
equally clear that he is not an officer." 13 0 The Court cited the "occasional and intermittent" nature of his employment, the fact that
he served only when the Commissioner of Pensions determined
that a surgeon was necessary to examine a particular pensioner,
and that he was paid by the examination rather than through a
regular appropriation. 18'
This bifurcated approach to officer status was apparently laid to
rest in two cases decided in 1888, United States v. Mouat13 2 and
United States v. Smith."'3 In Mouat, the Court read Germaine as
holding that "[u]nless a person in the service of the Government
. . .holds his place by virtue of an appointment [in compliance
with the formal requirements] he is not, strictly speaking, an officer of the United States."113 4 Similarly, in Smith, the Court held
that the defendant was not an officer since an
officer of the United States can only be appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or by a court of
law, or the head of a department. A person in the service of the
Government who does not derive his position from one of those
sources is not an officer of the United States in the sense of the
Constitution.'

Neither case relied upon the duties of the plaintiff's position with
the government. Only the formalities of his appointment were
relevant.
a written report, it is difficult to see how the term can have any objective
meaning.
so 99 U.S. at 511.
at 512.

131 Id.

132 124 U.S. 303 (1888). The plaintiff, a Navy paymaster's clerk, sought to be
paid his travel expenses, based upon a statute applicable to officers of the Navy.
Naval employees were to be paid at a lesser rate.
188 124 U.S. 525 (1888). The case involved a clerk in the office of the collector
of customs in New York City who was charged with embezzlement under a statute applicable to officers. The Court concluded that the collector of customs was
not the head of a department.

1" 124 U.S. at 307.
188 124 U.S. at 532; see also Oswald v. United States, 96 F.2d 10, 13 (9th
Cir. 1936); McGrath v. United States, 275 F. 294 (2d Cir. 1921); Scully v.
United States, 193 F. 185 (D. Nev. 1910); Comment, supra note 119, at 566
n.34; cf. Hoeppel v. United States, 85 F.2d 237, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 557 (1937) ("We think it is well settled that a person in the
service of the United States, who has been appointed in any of the modes pre-

scribed in . .. the Constitution, is an officer of the United States, and, con-

versely, that any person in the service of the United States who has not been so
appointed is not, strictly speaking, an officer of the United States.").

ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

[Vol. 1, 1986]

This position was strongly reaffirmed in Burnap v. United
States," s a 1920 Supreme Court decision which held that "[t]he
distinction between officer and employee

. . .

does not rest upon

differences in the qualifications necessary to fill the positions or in
the character of the service to be performed." 13 7 Thus, the fact

that an individual performs duties identical to an officer was insufficient to make that individual an officer if she was not appointed
as required by the Constitution. The term "officer" was effectively
drained of all meaning; it was simply a label to be applied to indi-

viduals who were hired in formal compliance with the constitutional requirements.
And thus the law remained, undisturbed until the recent Supreme Court decision of Buckley v. Valeo.13 8 With Buckley, the

Court called into question this existing interpretation of the appointments clause.
2.

Buckley v. Valeo: Starting Anew

Buckley involved a constitutional challenge to the method of
appointing the members of the Federal Election Commission (the
Commission), an agency created to oversee the campaign financing reforms adopted after Watergate. Under the existing law as
developed in Mouat, Smith, and Burnap, none of the six Federal
Election Commissioners (the Commissioners) were officers of the

United States since their appointment did not comply with consti252 U.S. 512 (1920).
Id. at 516. The distinction between "officer" and "employee," the Court
continued, "is determined by the manner in which Congress has specifically provided for the creation of the several positions, their duties and appointment
thereto." Id. The Court therefore looked to the statutes which authorized the
position, concluding that "[t]here is no statute which creates an office of landscape architect. . . nor any which defines the duties of the position." Id. at 517.
The considerations thus were purely formal: Did Congress and the President resolve the issue by providing for the position to be filled in the constitutional
manner?
1- 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). But see Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp.
1363 (D.D.C.), motion for stay pending appeal denied, 482 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir.
1973). Williams involved a challenge to the legality of the defendant serving as
acting director of the Office of Economic Opportunity since his name had never
been submitted to the Senate for confirmation. Plaintiffs were United States Senators who contended that, in the absence of a delegation of authority to appoint
the Director, his name was required to be submitted to the Senate for its advice
and consent. The district court agreed; the court of appeals denied the motion for
stay, concluding that the defendant had not shown sufficient likelihood for success on the merits. Neither court discussed the definition of "officer."
16
137
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tutional methods: two Commissioners were appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, two by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, and the final two, although appointed by the
President, were required to be confirmed by both the House and
the Senate. 3 9 The fact that the Commissioners were not officers,
however, was of little significance since there were no particular
consequences attached to that status; Burnap had, after all, held
that the distinction between "officer" and "employee" was purely
formal. The Buckley decision changed all of this. While not acknowledging the fact, the Court rejected the existing precedent by
holding that the Commissioners, despite their nonconstitutional
appointment, were nonetheless officers.
The Court began by discarding the formalist position adopted
in Burnap: the drafters of the appointments clause, the Court
stated, had "a less frivolous purpose" than merely prescribing
"protocol." 14 Instead, the term "officers of the United States"

was intended to have "substantive meaning. '"141 The Court found
support for this proposition in Germaine, reaffirming that decision's tautological definition of "officers" as " 'all persons who can

be said to hold an office under the government.'

",142

It concluded

that the "fair import" of the phrase is that "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States is an officer of the United States" who must be appointed
in compliance with the clause. 143 The Commissioners fit this definition, the Court decided, because they exercised as much authority as a postmaster first class or the clerk of a district court, positions previously held to be offices. 144 The Court then reviewed
other possible sources of congressional authority to create offices;
it concluded that, while Congress could create officers of Congress, the Commissioners were not such officers because the pow139 424 U.S. at 126.
140
141

Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.

Id. at 126 (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510).
Id. at 126. The Court subsequently phrased the definition as "all appointed
officials exercising responsibility under the public laws of the Nation." Id. at 131.
144 Id. at 126 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (postmaster)
and Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839) (court clerk)). This conclusion ignores the determination in Burnap that "[t]he distinction between officer
and employee in this connection does not rest upon differences in the qualifications necessary to fill the positions or in the character of the service to be performed." Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. at 516.
142

148
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ers which they exercised were executive in nature. Executive pow45
ers cannot be vested in officers of Congress.1
The decision thus intertwines appointments clause and separation-of-powers concerns. The constitutional difficulty was not that
the delegated powers infringed upon the executive, but rather that
the Commission could not exercise such powers because of the
manner in which it was appointed; an officer who carries out executive authority cannot be appointed by Congress."4' The legislative branch cannot both create an office with enforcement powers
and retain unilateral power to appoint the officeholder since this
allows Congress both to enact and to enforce the law. 147 This is
precisely the danger of which Madison and Montesquieu warned:
"'When the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person or body .
there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.' "i
Given this spectre of tyranny, the standard which the Court enun14 The Court held that the Commission as appointed might exercise the investigative and information gathering responsibilities delegated to it since these
functions could "be regarded as merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress" and thus were powers which Congress could constitutionally delegate to
an officer of Congress. 424 U.S. at 138. This was not the case with the enforcement powers delegated to the Commission, however, because such powers fell
within the President's power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Such functions can only be exercised by
officers of the United States. 424 U.S. at 141.
140 "[Tlhe Commission's inability to exercise certain powers [delegated to it is
due to] the method by which its members have been selected .... " 424 U.S. at
142; see also Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 607 F. Supp.
962, 972 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 875, 881-87 (3d Cir. 1986) (distinguishing between giving executive officers legislative powers and giving legislative officers executive powers). See generally Burkoff, supra note 119, at 1369-80.
147 We hold that these provisions of the Act, vesting in the Commission
primary responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the courts of the
United States for vindicating public rights, violate [the appointments
clause] of the Constitution. Such functions may be discharged only by persons who are "Officers of the United States" within the language of that
section.
424 U.S. at 140; cf. id. at 272 (White, J., concurring) ("A fundamental tenet [of
the drafters of the Constitution] was that the same persons should not both legislate and administer the laws.").
14 Id. at 120 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302 (J. Madison) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (quoting Montesquieu) (emphasis in original)); cf. id. at 138
("The Commission's enforcement power, exemplified by its discretionary power
to seek judicial relief. . . is the ultimate remedy for a breach of law, and it is to
the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' ").
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ciated makes sense: whether a federal employee appointed by
Congress exercises significant executive authority under a congressional delegation is central to the separation-of-powers concern
with the accumulation of unchecked power by one branch. 49
3.

The Council and the Appointments Clause

It is clear that Council members are not officers of the United
States since they were appointed by the Governors of the four regional states. 150 Furthermore, Congress did not intend them to be
federal officers, specifically providing in PNEPPCA that the
"members . . . of the Council shall not be deemed to be officers
or employees of the United States for any purpose. 1 51 Following
Buckley, however, there remains the additional question of
whether the members must be officers of the United States because of the authority which they possess. The challenge to the
constitutionality of the Council is based on this point. The Council's opponents rely upon Buckley's definition of "officer" as "any
appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of
'49 The decline, if not demise, of the nondelegation doctrine, makes the appointments clause a more attractive basis for attacking Congressional policy.
While theoretically Congress has greater authority to delegate power, it is prohibited from retaining appointive powers beyond confirmation. It would thus
have greater leeway in delegating, but would know that when it did so the offices
it created would be staffed by officers under executive control. In this regard the
Buckley decision is like Chadha: once Congress chooses to delegate power, it
cannot retain formal independent authority over the delegatee. Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In Buckley, this meant
that Congress could not independently appoint-and thus remove-the individuals exercising the delegated power. In Chadha it meant that Congress could not
delegate authority while retaining power to override individual judgments of the
delegatee. As the Court recently noted:
Congress of course initially determined the content of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act; and undoubtedly the content
of the Act determined the nature of the executive duty. However, as
Chadha makes clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution
of its enactment only indirectly-by passing new legislation.
Bowsher v. Synar, 54 U.S.L.W. 5064, 5069 (U.S. July 7, 1986). In each situation, Congress was required to involve the executive. See generally Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
150 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act §
4(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(3) (1982).
151 Id. § 4(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(3); see also id. § 4(a)(2)(A)(iv), 16
U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2)(A)(iv) (the Council "shall not be considered an agency or
instrumentality of the United States for the purpose of any Federal law").
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the United States." 1 2 They contend that its members exercise
such authority and thus are federal officers who must be appointed in compliance with the appointments clause.' 5 '
The Buckley Court's determination that the Commissioners
were officers provides little guidance.154 Perhaps because all the
parties acknowledged that the Commissioners were more than
mere employees, 155 the Court did not, feel it necessary to do more
than note that the Commissioners must be officers because they
exercised powers as significant as other positions previously determined to be offices." 5 Despite the limited analysis of the question,
three requirements can be parsed from the decision. 57 First, the
definition is applicable only to executive/administrative and judicial officers. This requirement is found in the care with which the
424 U.S. at 126.
Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 52; see also Seattle Master
Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning
Council, 786 F.2d at 1373-74 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
I" In a footnote to its conclusion that the Commissioner's "are at the very
least . . . 'inferior Officers,'" the Court did note that the term "officers of the
United States" did not include all individuals employed by Ithe federal government since there is the additional class, "employees." 424 U.S. at 126 n.162. The
Court defined "employees" as "lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the
United States." Id. The Commissioners were not employees because they "are
not subject to the control or direction of any other executive, judicial, or legislative authority." Id. This definition is insufficient to separate "employees" from
"inferior officers" since the latter category is also subject to the control and direction of officers of the United States.
15

155 Id.

"I Id. at 126 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (postmasters) and Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839) (court clerk)). One
question raised by the Court's uncritical reliance on Myers and Hennen, is
whether all positions previously determined to be offices are still to be treated as
such. If so, the number of unconstitutionally appointed officers is very large. See,
e.g., United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760 (1877) (assistant surgeons); United
States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1867) (Treasury Department clerk);
Kennedy v. United States, 146 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1944) (junior instructors of
shop mathematics); Callahan v. United States, 122 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
(customs clerks); United States v. McCrory, 91 F. 295 (5th Cir. 1899) (letter
carriers); Surowitz v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (attorneys); Basking v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.S.C. 1940) (prison
guards). See generally Burkoff, supra note 119, at 1364-67.
157 Cf. Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and
Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1365 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976)) ("The appointments clause applies to (1) all executive or administrative officers, 424 U.S. at 123-26; (2) who serve pursuant to federal law, 424
U.S. at 126; and (3) who exercise significant authority over federal government
actions. 424 U.S. at 126-27 & n.162. Unless all three prongs of the Buckley test
are met, there is no violation of the appointments clause.").
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Court distinguished officers of the United States from other officers, such as officers of Congress.' 58 Second, an officer of the
United States must exercise "significant authority." It is unclear
what constitutes "significant authority" since the court merely asserted a fortiori that the Commissioners exercised such powers. 5 9
Third, that authority must be exercised "pursuant to the laws of
the United States." That is, the source of the individual's authority to act must be a federal statute.
The dispute in Seattle Master Builders Association focuses on
this final requirement. Those challenging the Council's constitutionality contend that the source of the Council's authority is a
federal statute, PNEPPCA.1' 0 The Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, concluded that
the Council members perform their duties pursuant to a compact
which requires both state legislation and congressional approval.
Without substantive state legislation, there would be no Council
and no Council members to appoint. While congressional consent
gives the interstate compact some attributes of federal law, the
Council members' appointment, salaries and administrative operations are pursuant to the laws of the four individual states, within
1" 424 U.S. at 139-41. Recognizing that Congress has the authority under the
necessary and proper clause to create generic offices to be filled as it determines,
the Court concluded that this power is bounded by the appointments clause: if
Congress chooses to fill the office in a manner different than that provided by the
clause, the appointee will not be an officer of the United States. In such cases,
the appointees may "properly perform duties only in aid of those functions that
congress may carry out by itself, or in an area sufficiently removed from the
administration and enforcement of the public law as to permit their being performed by persons not 'Officers of the United States.'" Id. at 139; cf. Bowsher v.
Synar, 54 U.S.L.W. 5064 (U.S. July 7, 1986) (prohibiting the comptroller general, as an officer of Congress, from performing executive functions).
159 424 U.S. at 126. Justice White, in a concurring opinion, concluded simply
that it was "evident" that the Commissioners were among the officers of the
United States referred to in the appointments clause given "the breadth of their
assigned duties and the nature and importance of their assigned functions." Id.
at 269-70 (White, J., concurring). Both phrases are examples of the "I-know-itwhen-I-see-it" school of jurisprudence. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the requirement with an equally opaque phrase: "exercise [of] significant authority
over federal government actions." Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific
Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1365.
160 Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1373-74 (Beezer, J., dissenting); Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 52.
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parameters set by the Act. . . . More important, the states ultimately empower the Council members to carry out their duties.161
The challengers' contention that the Council is empowered by
federal rather than state law is, as the court concluded, based
upon a misperception of the congressional role in the creation of
interstate compacts. It also springs from two additional misperceptions: it ignores the basic thrust of the Buckley decision by
disregarding the crucial separation of powers context, and it fails
to recognize that Congress has the constitutional authority to subject the managers of federal property to nonfederal policymakers.
Each of these three failings requires additional discussion.
(a) The Appointments Clause and the Compact Clause
The homebuilders' appointments clause argument sweeps too
broadly because it impinges upon another constitutional provision,
the interstate compact clause. Regardless of the applicability of
the Buckley decision to other areas of federalism, it is necessarily
inapplicable to interstate compact agencies. To conclude otherwise
leads to the incongruous result that the members of all interstate
162
compact agencies must be appointed by the federal government.
161 Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1365 (citations omitted). The court
continued:
Federal law provides congressional consent for formation of the Council as
it does for the creation of all compacts and compact agencies. Federal law
also affects the substance of Council policy decisions because the Act constrains Council policy-making . . . and subjects some Council operations
to federal law. As with any compact, congressional consent did not result
in the creation but only authorized the creation of the compact organization and the appointment of its officials. The appointment, salaries and
direction of the Council members are state-derived.
Id.
162 In his dissent, Circuit Judge Beezer acknowledged that "[a] compact operates as federal law." Id. at 1377 (Beezer, J., dissenting). He seeks to avoid the
logical conclusion of this premise by contending that the Council "is not an ordinary compact" because it "can produce substantive effects under federal law."
Id. The fallacy in his analysis is that it ignores the premise from which it begins:
a compact is a federal law and thus all compact agencies operate pursuant to
federal law. The fact that the Council may "produce substantive effects under
federal law" is not relevant to its status as a compact agency because all compact
agencies produce such effects. Since all compact agencies necessarily exercise
such authority as a result of the constitutional requirement of congressional consent, it is at best incongruous to assert that this makes the Council different than
other compact agencies operating under like authority.
One of the continuing difficulties in responding to the challenger's arguments
is that they fail to clearly distinguish the two major issues: (1) What is the status
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The compact clause prohibits states from entering into any
agreement "without the consent of Congress. 16 3 The Supreme
Court has held that "congressional consent transforms an interstate compact within [the Compact] Clause into a law of the
United States."16 Therefore, the required congressional consent
makes the compact "a law of the United States" and all members
of a compact agency thus exercise their authority pursuant to federal law. If every individual who exercised authority pursuant to
federal law were required to be appointed under the appointments
of the Council? and (2) May any nonfederal entity exercise the authority the
Council exercises? If a state can exercise the type of authority delegated to the
Council, the fact that it is delegated to an interstate compact agency is immaterial because its status as a compact agency does not prevent it from exercising
such powers. See, e.g., Grad, supra note 100, at 846-48.
163 U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
164 Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981). In its earliest cases, the Supreme Court held that a compact, "by the sanction of Congress, has become a
law of the Union." Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 519, 566 (1851); see also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont
Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 430, 432-33 (1855). The Court then seemed
to question this result, holding, without mentioning Wheeling and Belmont
Bridge, that "[tihe assent of Congress did not make the act giving [the assent] a
statute of the United States." People v. Central R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 455,
456 (1870). The Court next asserted jurisdiction over the interpretation of a
compact, citing the language from Wheeling and Belmont Bridge that congressional assent to a compact made it "a law of the Union." Wedding v. Meyler,
192 U.S. 573, 582 (1904). The Court then noted that "[tihe decisions are not
uniform as to whether the interpretation of an interstate compact presents a federal question." Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304
U.S. 92, 110 n.12 (1938) (comparing People v. Central R.R. with Wedding v.
Meyler and Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155 (1894)). Finally, in Delaware River
Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 427 (1940), the Court
noted that the Central R.R. decision "has long been doubted," and concluded
that it had jurisdiction to hear cases arising under compacts because "a compact
sanctioned by Congress . . . involves a federal 'title, right, privilege or immunity.'" See also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n., 359 U.S. 275,
277 (1959); West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 26 (1951). Remaining doubts as to the status of compacts were finally settled when the Court
held that "congressional consent transforms an interstate compact within [the
Compact] Clause into a law of the United States." Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. at
438. See generally id. at 438-41, 450-51. The Court thus has returned to its
initial position: a compact, "by the sanction of Congress, has become a law of the
Union." Id. at 438; see also Jacobsen v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566
F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1977), affd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds
sub nom. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440
U.S. 391 (1979); League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 507 F.2d 517, 520-22 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974
(1975). See generally P. HARDY, supra note 95, at 19; Engdahl, Construction of
Interstate Compacts: A Questionable Federal Question, 51 VA. L. REV. 987
(1965).

ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

[Vol. 1, 19861

clause, the result would be anomalous: interstate compact agencies
could not be staffed with state appointees since all members of
such agencies would have to be federal officers. 16 5 The absurdity
of this conclusion suggests that it is incorrect. While congressional
consent makes the compact a federal statute for certain purposes,
that consent cannot transform the compact agency into a federal
entity. Rather, an interstate compact agency is a hybrid, reflecting
something of each of the parties-both the federal and state governments-necessary to its creation.
This hybrid nature is demonstrated by a recent Supreme Court
case, Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency. 166 The issue before the Court was whether the federal
courts had jurisdiction over an interstate compact agency under a
federal civil rights statute. The Court concluded that it did have
jurisdiction because the agency's actions were "under color of
state law," despite the fact that congressional consent meant that
the agency was also acting pursuant to federal law. 167 The Court
165 The Supreme Court's assessment of compacts as a valuable method for
resolving state disputes short of litigation was in error. See West Virginia ex rel.
Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. at 27-28.
166 440 U.S. 391, 400-02 (1979). The issue has also been examined-though
inconclusively-in the cases in which the courts have examined the immunity of
interstate compact agencies from suit under the eleventh amendment. The
amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens or another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XI.
In Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959), six Justices concluded that the eleventh amendment barred suits against interstate compact agencies unless the participating states had waived their immunity. Id. at
277. Three of these Justices joined in the Court's majority opinion, while the
other three filed a dissenting opinion. The remaining three Justices reached the
same conclusion as the majority "with the understanding that [they did] not
reach the constitutional question as to whether the Eleventh Amendment immunizes from suit agencies created by two or more States under state compacts
which the Constitution requires to be approved by the Congress." Id. at 283.
Thus, six of the nine Justices concluded that the agency was a state instrumentality. Both of the lower courts also decided that the agency was a state instrumentality, though they concluded that the states had not waived their immunity.
See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 153 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mo.
1957), affid, 254 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1958).
This holding was limited in Lake Country Estates, where the Court held that
the eleventh amendment was not applicable to an interstate compact agency
which exercised powers similar to counties and cities, entities not covered by the
amendment. The Court was careful, however, not to decide that all compact
agencies lacked immunity. 440 U.S. at 401.
107 440 U.S. at 398-400 & n.13.
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therefore rejected the court of appeals' conclusion that the agency
was solely a creature of federal law. 168
Two conclusions emerge from these cases. First, congressional
consent "transforms an interstate compact

. . .

into a law of the

United States," thus conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts
to construe the terms of such compacts' 6 and preempting inconsistent state constitutional and statutory provisions. 7 0 At the same
time, however, interstate compacts remain creatures of the in7
volved states subject to federal restrictions applicable to states.1 1
Interstate compact agencies, in short, are hybrids, partaking
something of both of the entities necessary to their creation. Attempting to categorize such agencies as either federal or state thus
misses the central point: they are both and neither.
(b) The Appointments Clause and the Separation of Powers
Doctrine
The challengers' argument also sweeps too broadly because it
seizes upon a phrase while ignoring its context. The Buckley
Court's entire analysis is predicated upon its construction of the
appointments clause in the context of its "cognate" separation-ofpowers provisions.172 The decision, as in Germaine and the other
appointments clause cases, was concerned with determining the
status of an individual who was employed by the United States.
The Court's definition thus was employed to distinguish between
classes of federal employees; it was not used to distinguish between federal and nonfederal employees. Since the two questions
differ radically, it is hardly surprising that a standard helpful in
resolving one leads to absurd results when applied to the other.
Similarly, the Buckley Court simply held that Congress could
not both create an office with enforcement powers and retain unilateral power to appoint the officeholder since this allowed Congress both to enact and to enforce the law.17 1 Within the separa18 See Jacobsen v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1358
(9th Cir. 1977).
169 Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981).
170 West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951).

Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
at 398-402.
172 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).
17 Id. at 140 ("We hold that these provisions of the Act, vesting in the Commission primary responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the courts of the
United States for vindicating public rights, violate [the appointments clause] of
17
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tion-of-powers context, the standard which the Court enunciated
makes sense: whether a federal employee appointed by Congress
exercises significant authority under a congressional delegation is
central to the separation-of-powers concern for the accumulation
of unchecked power within one branch. This concern is not present when the power to appoint is separated from the grantor of
the power. Thus, the Buckley standard is simply inapplicable because it does not answer the question raised by the procedure used
to appoint the members of the Council.
The challengers respond by noting that the Framers of the Constitution considered and rejected a proposal to allow the states to
appoint some federal officers. The proposal was rejected, they contend, because it violated the separation-of-powers goal of structuring the three branches of the federal government so that each had
sufficient intrinsic authority to resist the encroachments of the
other branches. They thus argue that the Council's method of appointment is unconstitutional because it results in a dilution of ex17
ecutive authority. '
It is important to note that the challenger's characterization of
the Framers' reasons for rejecting state appointment of federal officers is open to question. A more likely reading of the admittedly
scanty evidence suggests that state appointment of federal officers
was rejected on federalism rather than separation-of-powers
grounds: Governor Morris objected to the motion to allow state
appointment because "[t]his would be putting it in the power of
the states to say, 'You shall be viceroys but we will be viceroys
over you.' ,,"'
The concepts of federalism and separation of powers implicate different interests. As examined in more detail below, the Council does not violate traditional federalism
restrictions.
The fundamental problem with this branch of the homebuilders'
argument, however, is that it fails to address the central question:
How can state and federal officers be distinguished? That is, is the
definition provided by the Buckley Court relevant to the determithe Constitution. Such functions may be discharged only by persons who are
'Officers of the United States' within the language of that section."). See Bowsher v. Synar, 54 U.S.L.W. 5064, 5069 (U.S. July 7, 1986) ("[W]e see no escape from the conclusion that, because Congress had retained removal authority
over the Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted with executive powers.").
114 See Petitioners' Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 22-25; United States Brief,
supra note 4, at 18-19.
175
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1787, 406 (1911).
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nation of an individual's status as either a federal officer or a state
officer? To the extent that these are very different questions, the
challengers' historical argument is simply irrelevant.
Again, the difficulty is that the challengers seek to lift a phrase
that phrase to answer a problem
from a complex decision, and use
176
resolve.
to
intended
not
was
it
(c) The Appointments Clause and Federalism: The Property
Clause
Finally, the challengers' argument that the Council exercises
"significant authority pursuant to federal law" sweeps too broadly
because their wooden application of the phrase would invalidate
many programs and processes which have long gone unquestioned.
Many individuals who are not officers of the United States nonetheless exercise significant authority under federal law. The argument fails to acknowledge that Congress has the authority to
waive federal supremacy, thus subjecting federal agencies to the
control of nonfederal bodies.
Questions arise largely because the Council's authority to guide
the conduct of a federal agency seems to violate one of the fundamental principles of American constitutional law: federal activities
are immune from state interference or control. This immunity is
simply one result of the principle that federal actions are supreme. 177 As Chief Justice Marshall stated in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 7 8 "[tihe government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in
pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land,
'any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary

notwithstanding.'

"179

Federal supremacy may, however, be waived. Congress can authorize nonfederal entities to exercise control over federal agen17 Cf. Respondents' Brief, supra note 8, at 65 ("In Buckley, the Court was
concerned with the degree of authority required to constitute a person within the
federal government as an 'inferior officer' of the United States. It was simply not
addressing the question of which persons are officers of the United States as
opposed to officers of some other political body, such as a state." (emphasis in

original)).
7 The supremacy clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
178

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

170

Id. at 406 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
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cies, just as it can waive sovereign immunity, supremacy's procedural first cousin. These waivers of federal supremacy effectively
delegate congressional authority since they empower nonfederal
entities to regulate activities which they would otherwise be unable to control.
The authority of Congress to subject federal agencies to regulation by nonfederal entities has long been upheld. Furthermore, in
no area has Congress as consistently or as broadly waived
supremacy as it has when dealing with federal property. At the
center of PNEPPCA lies an allocation of federal property: the hydroelectricity produced by the Federal Columbia River Power
System. 180 This hydroelectricity is federal property subject to congressional control under the property clause of the Constitution. 181
Under the property clause, Congress possesses plenary power over
the disposition of federal property; as the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, "'[t]he power over [public property] thus en-

trusted to Congress is without limitations.' "181
When legislating for public property, Congress has frequently
chosen to waive federal supremacy so that state laws will be applicable to federal property managers. The Reclamation Act of
1902, for example, requires the Secretary of the Interior to "proceed in conformity with [state water rights] laws" in constructing
16oDuring the debates on PNEPPCA, its proponents repeatedly asserted that
the "purpose of the bill is to solve an allocation problem," the allocation of cheap
federal hydroelectricity among the competing regional claimants. See 126 CONG.
REc. 29,804-05 (1980) (statement of Rep. Foley); see also id. at 27,810, (statement of Rep. Ullman); id.at 27,809 (statement of Rep. Kazen).
I"1 The property clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. In
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 297 U.S. 288, 330-39 (1936),
the Supreme Court held that the property clause provided express authority for
the federal government, through TVA, to generate and sell electricity. The Court
concluded that there was nothing to distinguish electricity-"which simply is the
mechanical energy, incidental to falling water at the dam, converted into the
electrical energy"-from other property subject to congressional control under
the clause. Id. at 340.
181 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (quoting United States
v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)); see also Ivanhoe Irrigation District v.
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273
(1954); Federal Power Comm'n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952);
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947); Gibson v. Choteau, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1871); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537
(1840). Congress' plenary power over federal property has led to expansive interpretations of congressional authority to waive federal supremacy in conjunction
with the property clause.
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federal water projects.183 In a recent challenge to the authority of
California to impose restrictions on the operation of a federal irrigation project and the disposition of the water it stores, the Supreme Court upheld the restrictions, acknowledging the authority
of Congress to subject federal property managers to state bodies. 18 4 Similar examples abound: the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to condition the granting of rights of way across federal lands upon "com-

pliance with State [health, environmental, and siting] standards
. . .if those standards are more stringent than applicable Federal
standards.' 85 This provision has repeatedly been construed to require compliance with state substantive standards.' 86 In perhaps
the most striking example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Secretary of the Interior was required to condition a
BPA right of way upon compliance with route-specific standards
developed by a state agency.1 87 Similarly, the Clean Water Act

requires the applicant for a federal license for "any activity...
which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters" to
provide a certificate from the appropriate state or "interstate
water pollution control agency" that the discharge will be in compliance with state or interstate standards. 88 This provision effectively grants the state or interstate body the power to prevent the
issuance of federal licenses and is an exercise of significant au43 U.S.C. § 383 (1982).
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 651-53, 674-79 (1978). The
state board imposed twenty-five conditions on the project, including a requirement that preference be given to users within the basin in which the dam was
located, that water be released to control chemical concentrations in the river,
and that access to the project site be provided. Id. at 652 n.8. These conditions
were significant restrictions on the control and disposition of federal property-yet the Court praised the Reclamation Act of 1902 authorizing such
nonfederal control as a leading example of "cooperative federalism," without any
suggestion that it was unconstitutional for Congress to require a federal agency
to comply with the determinations of a nonfederal entity. Id. at 650.
M 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a)(iv) (1982); see also id. § 1712(c)(8) (in preparing
and revising land use plans, the Secretary "shall . . . provide for compliance
with applicable pollution control laws, including State and Federal air, water,
noise, or other pollution standards or implementation plans").
186Citizens & Landowners Against the Miles City/New Underwood Powerline v. Secretary of Energy, 683 F.2d 1171, 1178-82 (8th Cir. 1982); Columbia
Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 604-05 (9th Cir.
1981).
187 Montana v. Johnson, 738 F.2d 1074, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 1984); see also
Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1985).
18 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1982).
188
'"
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thority under federal law. In the face of an argument that federal
facilities were required to comply with state air pollution laws, the
Supreme Court held that it was a question of congressional intent:
federal facilities can be regulated by nonfederal entities when
there is "a clear congressional mandate" authorizing such
regulation.18 9
The law is straightforward: while federal actions are supreme
under the Constitution, Congress has the authority to waive that
supremacy and subject federal agencies to the control of
nonfederal entities. The only question in such situations is whether
18BHancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976) (citing Kern-Limerick, Inc. v.

Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 122 (1954)); cf Environmental Protection Agency v.
California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 211 (1976)
("Federal installations are subject to state regulation only when and to the extent
that congressional authorization is clear and unambiguous."). Congress subsequently reversed the result (though not the principle) in Hancock by amending
the Clean Air Act to require all federal facilities and activities which might discharge air pollutants to comply with all "state, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control
and abatement of air pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as
any nongovernmental entity." 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1982). The Clean Water
Act contains a similarly worded waiver. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982). Failure
to comply with a state water quality control plan was a basis for enjoining a
proposed National Forest Service timber sale. None of the parties felt that the
state regulation was constitutionally impermissible. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 588-89 (9th Cir. 1985); see also
Sierra Club v. Peterson, 705 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the President had the authority through an Executive Order to require federal agencies to
comply with state permit requirements before applying herbicides to federal
timberlands). See generally Breen, FederalSupremacy and Sovereign Immunity
Waivers in Federal Environmental Law, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)

10,325 (1985).
Similarly, in construing the Coastal Zone Management Act's requirement that
actions "directly affecting" the coastal zone were required to be consistent with
state plans, the Court did not indicate that there was any constitutional question
that Congress could not so condition the uses of federal property. See Secretary
of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 339-40 (1984).
The parties challenging the constitutionality of the Northwest Power Planning
Council seem to assert that Congress cannot constitutionally waive federal
supremacy: "Congress has put a State-appointed body in a privileged position
over the Federal Executive, granting it the right to constrain the discretion of the
Federal government alone. This violates national supremacy." Petitioners' Reply
Brief, supra note 7 at 33. The argument is not developed.

The Council and the Constitution

Congress has provided the requisite "clear mandate.""'
PNEPPCA provides such a mandate. 191
Congressional power under the property clause can provide req-

uisite authority for PNEPPCA in another way. Congress has the
power under the clause to authorize other entities to control the
acquisition or disposition of federal property. The classic example
is the authority granted to miners' organizations and states to de-

termine requirements for the acquisition of rights to mineral resources on the public lands.'"9 If Congress may constitutionally
empower local miners' organizations or states to adopt rules controlling the disposition of federal property, it may also constitu-

tionally authorize an interstate compact agency to do so.'"
One of the Council's functions under PNEPPCA is to effect the
9
acquisition"'
and disposition 95 of federal property. The Council
thus can be viewed as a "local legislature" overseeing the acquisition and disposition of federal property. 19 As such, it is well
190 In his dissent, Circuit Judge Beezer rejected this argument because of "the
peculiar nature of the Council." Seattle Master Builders Ass'n. v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d at 1376 (Beezer,
J., dissenting). He begins by noting that
[i]n some cases, Congress specifies that federal entities must obey state

laws that would otherwise be preempted ....

In those cases, Congress has

merely narrowed the scope of federal preemption. The state legislatures
are not authorized to pass legislation solely for the purpose of regulating
federal agencies.
Id. at 1377. This argument ignores the fact'that the Model Conservation Standards (MCS), which are the subject of the suit, were adopted to regulate
homebuilders throughout the region. The effect of the MCS on BPA is only incidental to this primary purpose. See Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act § 4(f), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(f) (1982).
191

12

See supra notes 43-68 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905).

193 See generally Gaetke, Separation of Powers, Legislative Vetoes, and the
Public Lands, 56 U. COLo. L. REv. 559 (1985).

I" Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act § 6(b),
(c), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(b), (c) (1982).
Id. § 5(d)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(3).
I,

See Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. at 126. The Supreme Court
has held that Congress, acting as a proprietor, occupies a position analogous to a
principal and that, as such, it may designate an agent to manage its property.
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474-75 (1915). Congressional
designation of the Council as its agent to oversee the disposition of federal hydroelectricity is within the traditional scope of congressional discretion over federal
property since Congress has frequently granted nonfederal entities the authority
to control acquisition of rights in federal property. Cf. United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30 (1940) (congressional power under the clause is
"without limitations. 'And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be
administered. That is for Congress to determine.'" (quoting Light v. United
'
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within the constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate
the public's property.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the challengers' argument is flawed by their characterization of the case in separation-of-powers terms. This approach ignores the federalism issue, obscuring the essential question posed by the new regional "constitution" created by Congress
and the states: Does the Constitution prohibit the use of such cooperative regional institutions to manage regional resources? The
problem with the challengers' argument thus stems from their
mischaracterization of the issue. While both federalism and sepa-

ration doctrines are attempts to prevent tyranny by promoting
tension among different political bodies through the division of political power,1 97 the two doctrines' focus differs. Separation focuses
on the horizontal relationship among the three branches of the
federal government with an eye to a balancing of powers among
them. 198 Federalism, on the other hand, is concerned with the verStates, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911))); Capital Co. v. Fox, 85 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir.
1936) ("Congress may not indeed delegate its powers to the states generally, but
the doctrine is not universally true; in some matters it certainly may do just
that."); United States v. Matherson, 367 F. Supp. 779, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
(noting that Congress' plenary power over public property "is without limitation
and preempts that of the Executive or of the several states unless Congress specifically authorizes the adminstration of public land by one or both of these governmental units." (emphasis added)).
19'See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
198 The Supreme Court provided the following classic formulation:
It is believed to be one of the chief merits of the American system of
written constitutional law, that all the powers intrusted to government,
whether State or national, are divided into three grand departments, the
executive, the legislative and the judicial. That the functions appropriate to
each of these branches of government shall be vested in a separate body of
public servants, and that the perfection of the system requires that the
lines which separate and divide these departments shall be broadly and
clearly defined. It is also essential to the successful working of this system
that the person intrusted with the powers in any one of these branches
shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the others,
but that each shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of
the powers appropriate to its own department and no other.
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-91 (1880); see also Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928). Such hyperbolic views, of course, belong
more to rhetoric than to reality. Thus, the Court has acknowledged that "the
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tical balance between local and national authority.""
The separation doctrine refers to the balance between three
named institutions: Congress, the President, and the Supreme
Court. It is built into the structure of the federal government
through the delegations of legislative, executive, and judicial
power in the first three articles of the Constitution.20 0 The Constitution established certain decision making processes which allow
these three institutions with their different constituencies, values,
and priorities to interact with each other over time, in the belief
that the policies produced by the process will, in the long run,
reflect a broad range of constitutional and social values. The basic
issue under the separation doctrine thus is whether the actions of
one named institution threaten the ability of another named institution to carry out its functions in jointly running the government.
The focus is on relationships and interconnections. As the Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which [a challenged
statute] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. .

.

.Only where the potential for

disruption is present must we determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress. 0'
Federalism, on the other hand, is concerned not with the intrusion of one branch of the federal government into the constitutional role of another branch, but rather with the intrusion of one
layer of government into the realm of another-with claims of local autonomy, for example, against demands of national uniformseparate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence."
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974). Indeed, the view of the federal government as composed of "three airtight departments" has been labeled
"archaic." Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). In
its stead, the Court has repeatedly cited with approval the language of Justice
Jackson: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it
also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,

autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). This pragmatic, flexible perception of
the doctrine is more in accord with Madison's views on the question. See THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 47-48 (J. Madison); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

15-17 (1978).

'" See generally R. POUND, Law and Federal Government, in FEDERALISM AS
A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 3 (1942).
200 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 149.
'01 Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (citations
omitted); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974).

ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

[Vol. 1, 19861

ity.202

Since the supremacy clause specifies that the national interest must prevail over the local when the subject matter has been
delegated to the national government, federalism questions generally begin with the powers granted to the federal government. 3
The supremacy clause, however, does not require Congress to occupy a field completely or prohibit it from authorizing concurrent
or exclusive state action.10 4 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that local variations are a basis for construing federal
supremacy narrowly.20 5
The distinction between federalism and separation issues, thus,
is the distinction between concerns for local autonomy as against
national control, on the one hand, and effective political parity
among Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court, on the
other. The question of the constitutionality of the Council raises
federalism issues. In enacting PNEPPCA, Congress recognized
the local interest in the regional hydroelectric and fishery resources and sought to balance those values against the national
interest in managing federal property.. Thus, the issues concern
201

Federalism can be defined as "any political system in which there is a con-

stitutional distribution of powers between provincial governments and a common
central authority." W.

BENNETT,

AMERICAN

THEORIES

OF FEDERALISM

10

(1964). The concern thus is with the intrusion of the federal government into
areas of state authority, with state intrusions into areas of federal authority, or
with one state intruding into another's authority. As with separation, the Constitution provides more process than substance; the representation of the local interests in the federal legislature ensures that such concerns have a say. Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). As James
Madison noted, "the new Federal Government . . . will partake sufficiently of
the spirit of [the States], to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual
States, or the prerogatives of their governments." THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at
319 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See generally id. Nos. 17 (A. Hamilton),
46 (J. Madison).
203 The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 199, 235
(1796).
"" See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248-56 (1985);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-23 (1983); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-52 (1963).
1*1 E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 148-49.
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the degree to which local interests, when they differ from national
interests, may be authorized to affect federal decision making.
The question of the constitutionality of the Council is not a separation issue since Congress has not weakened the office of the
President by enacting the statute; it does not "upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government.' "206 In fact, Congress
has not directly challenged presidential authority. Congress has
merely limited the authority of an administrative agency, an entity that is not subject to the exclusive control of any of the three
constitutional actors, but is instead subject to varying types of
control by each.
This does not mean that the separation and federalism doctrines
denominate two watertight compartments anymore than do the
terms "executive," "legislative," and "judicial." Disputes may implicate complex combinations of federalism and separation issues.
Nevertheless, the Council's authority over BPA impinges, at most,
only marginally on the President's constitutional authority and
does not upset "the proper balance between the coordinate
branches. ' 20 7 This is the teaching of the Buckley Court's analysis
of the Federal Elections Commission: the act creating the Commission was unconstitutional because it threatened to upset the
balance by reserving to Congress both the power to create offices
and to control the officeholders.
This is also the teaching of the numerous cases in which the
Supreme Court has upheld congressional actions subjecting federal agencies to state supervision: the President is not attacked by
requiring federal property managers to comply with state pollution or facility siting laws.20 8 Rather, Congress is engaged in the
political balancing of local and national interests. The court's role
in such cases is to ensure that Congress intended to allow the local
interests to predominate. 0 9
'"
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (quoting Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. V. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)).
207 Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
208 See supra notes 183-94 and accompanying text; cf. Safe Harbor Water
Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 124 F.2d 800, 807-08 (3d Cir. 1941)
(upholding congressional authorization for states to regulate interstate electricity
rates through an interstate compact agency, even though this displaced the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission).
30
See, e.g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976) (federal facilities
can be regulated by nonfederal entities when there is "a clear congressional mandate" authorizing such regulations).
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The argument that the Northwest Power Planning Council is an
unconstitutional intrusion by Congress into an area reserved to the
President, thus, is a red herring. Congress has long exercised the
power to waive federal supremacy and subject federal property
managers to the control of nonfederal bodies. This long history
reflects the simple fact that in doing so Congress has done nothing
which prevents the executive "from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. ' 1 0

10

Nixon v. AdministratAr of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 443.

